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DECEMBER, 1976

SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1976

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Current History

DECEMBER, 1976

VOL. 71, NO. 422

What economic and political problems face the nations of Southeast Asia? What forms are their independent governments taking? In this issue, seven articles evaluate questions like these. Our introductory article on United States policy in the area concludes that: "American diplomats must be increasingly sensitive to the intraregional competition between Marxist forms of modernization and traditional, indigenous forms of private and family capitalism. More nations of Southeast Asia may turn to ideological marxism because of American aloofness and inattention than because of clever Soviet or Chinese diplomacy."

The United States in Southeast Asia

By L. EDWARD SHUCK, JR.

Director of International Programs, Bowling Green State University

THE CHALLENGE to American diplomacy in the 1970's is to bridge the gap of misunderstanding and shared misperceptions that separate the third world from the United States. In Southeast Asia, United States diplomacy continues to be confused by the chimera of communism and an inability to accept serious social change—even rebellion—that is not articulated in eighteenth century hyperbole.

The official American relationship to each of the nations of Southeast Asia has gone through a post-World War II period of accelerating change. The United States reaction to these changes has been further confused during the past three years because of the insecurity of a non-elected President carrying out the policies of the repudiated President who chose him. To foreign diplomats and politicians, President Gerald Ford was in effect in limbo until he could be validated or repudiated by an election. The elections of November, 1976, have at last cleared the path for new foreign policy initiatives.

The substantive blunder of greatest magnitude in United States foreign policy after World War II was to regard international politics as a segment of military doctrine and an expression of military operations. Largely meaningless alignments with uninformed anti-Marxist leaders epitomized American foreign policy operations. The strength of the United States was hidden behind a façade of fear that thickened through five consecutive presidential adminis-

trations. A distorted image of the United States stunted the growth of American influence and prestige in Southeast Asia.

The two constant preoccupations of Southeast Asian governments are to build more efficient institutions in response to demands for technological sophistication and to protect their assets from the covetous superpowers and from Japan. Sadly, the Southeast Asians have coped for too long with the fact that a United States presence promotes a militarized and conservative government. The efforts of the United States to drag Burma and Cambodia, especially, into its military circle resulted in the expulsion of the United States presence from both these societies in the 1960's and led to the destruction of Cambodia (1970-1975).

Southeast Asian leadership has been experimenting with constitutional arrangements to find political lifestyles that can link local tradition to the modern requirements of efficient government. This has proved extremely difficult, because of the centripetal forces of ethnocentricity. Frustration has been accentuated by the underlying competition between traditional family capitalism rooted in traditional social village obligations, and various Marxist offshoots, with their peculiar versions of modernization. The governments of these varying societies were also dealing with the industrialized complexes of the Atlantic powers and Japan. "Neo-colonialism," in the jargon of Indonesian leader Sukarno, was not all fantasy.

Beyond intraregional considerations, no comment about United States foreign policy can ignore the delicacy of the current *influence balance* in the eastern Pacific, which is affected by the changes in Southeast Asia.

United States foreign policy operations in Southeast Asia can no longer be viewed within the framework of military doctrine. The United States faces growing pressure to deal with Southeast Asians in terms of changing relations among the governments and peoples of the area. In the long run, the two giants will be the Vietnamese and the Indonesians; of the two, the momentum indicates growing power for the nearly 50 million Vietnamese instead of the still confused pattern of life-styles and economic practices of the 130 million Indonesians. In the short run, the first order of business is to bring Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into speaking terms with Thailand and the Philippines. This also means that the United States must normalize its relations with Vietnam and Cambodia and, to a less pressing degree, with Laos.

Ongoing United States policies toward Southeast Asia should be conceived within the parameters of two balance systems that inextricably involve the United States. There is the competition for status and influence among those societies whose economic and financial institutions ennoble social, economic, and political compromise and are sufficiently "capitalist" to fear disequilibrium. There is also a precarious balance between economically open societies, on the one hand, and the countries, mostly Marxist in orientation, that are committed to state control of economic production, to international exchange of commodities by central government negotiation and to the subordination of public finance to political ends.

More precisely focused, in terms of United States-Southeast Asian relations, one must remain aware of the regional power struggle going on under the shadow of a worldwide competition among the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The regional competition is being reshaped by an enigmatic Japan. Americans are inclined to accept capitalist, highly technological and self-centered Japan as an ally with whom they can easily communicate. It is perhaps more important to view Japan's swing role in East

¹ United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 1st Session, *Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam*, 5th rev. ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969). See p. 113 for a statement of the pertinent words—and assumptions—of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO). Also, the report of Dean Rusk to the United States Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, *Supplemental Foreign Assistance—FY 1966, Vietnam* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 467ff.

² As one commentary on ASEAN, see this writer's "Outward Reach of Indonesia," *Current History*, December, 1972, pp. 256 and 257.

Asian affairs. Japan has her own destiny to protect, and she has her own expectations with respect to China, Korea and Taiwan. These also embrace a special relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet the United States and Japan, because of their unique relationship and their relations with the "developed," market-economy areas or the Atlantic world, must cooperate in their dealings with Southeast Asia. Whether the Soviet Union and China will similarly cooperate for a discernible mutual benefit in the area is not yet clear.

ASEAN AND ITS PROBLEMS

One objective of American diplomacy is the accurate measuring of balances within regional groupings, as regional alignments become more important. The superpower best able to understand and manipulate balances within these blocs will more surely preserve influence and successfully defend its interests.

Since its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), limited to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore, has consistently developed a core-policy designed to turn Southeast Asia into a "zone of peace and neutrality." On the other hand, the members have been reluctant to break nonmilitary ties with the United States, even as they have made direct efforts to enlarge their membership to include Burma and the Indochinese states, and to update their connections with China and the Soviet Union.

An authentic Southeast Asian regional organization is in the best interests of all the superpowers and Japan. The now defunct SEATO was an Anglo-American creation of the spring and summer of 1954. Its advertised intent was quickly twisted by Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk to provide a well-oiled excuse for United States military intervention in Indochina and the enlarging of the United States military presence in Thailand and the Philippines.¹ Especially for Thailand, the memory of SEATO was a stain on her efforts to regain traditional neutrality and a position of respect among her neighbors.

At the Heads of State meeting of ASEAN in Bali, in February, 1976, a Declaration of Concord reaffirmed the commitment of the members to the concept that Southeast Asia must be a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality," and promised a "programme of action."² Malaysian Prime Minister Datu Hussain Onn labeled regionalism "the cornerstone of Malaysian foreign policy," and assured fellow delegates that regionalism will continue "to be given primacy in Malaysia's foreign policy." The group also agreed on a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and created a Permanent Secretariat for ASEAN, based in Djakarta. The group also expressed words of reconciliation toward the

absent Southeast Asian governments of Burma and the three Indochinese states.³

The major difficulty in the redrawing and clarification of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia concerns Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. All these governments have reason to distrust or hate the United States. There has been no hint of apology, no indication of American responsibility for the physical destruction of Indochina in all the well-structured rhetoric of United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford during the past eight years. Yet the situation requires at least the fulfillment of the vague promises of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Nixon to provide American assistance to rebuild the infrastructure of Indochina, which was virtually obliterated by American firepower during 15 years of indirect and another 15 years of direct attack. The Kissinger agreements of October 26, 1972, repudiated by Nixon as he resumed the heavy bombing and artillery attacks on Vietnam during the Christmas season of 1972, were followed by the agreements of January, 1973—after another half million Vietnamese had been killed or wounded. Both agreements provided that the United States would “contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.”⁴

Vietnam has responded with a diplomatic opening to the several promises of United States aid. The Vietnamese recently identified a need for a more thorough search for the bodies and burial places of missing American soldiers if and when the United States negotiates economic and technical assistance to Vietnam.⁵ The Paris agreements were, of course, violated long ago by both Americans and Vietnamese. Yet it is to the benefit of the United States to make a serious effort to restore an American presence in Vietnam. The identification of Americans still “missing” should no more hold back this step than it held back the post-World War II rebuilding of Germany and Japan. It is just as important to establish an American presence among our former enemies in Southeast Asia as it was to reestablish an American

³ See Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Affairs, Malaysia*, vol. 9, March, 1976, p. 1. for verbatim copies of these documents and accompanying speeches.

⁴ Note Section 8 of the October Agreement, *The New York Times*, October 27, 1972, and Article 21 of the Paris Agreements of January, 1973. *Ibid.*, January 24, 1973.

⁵ See, e.g., the report of Fox Butterfield, *ibid.*, November 9, 1975.

⁶ *The New York Times*, June 12, 1975, and February 2, 1976, contain reports of these transactions.

⁷ *The New York Times*, August 18, 1976.

⁸ See the *Wall Street Journal*, September 16, 1976, including editorial article.

⁹ Note *The New York Times*, September 2, 1976, for a discussion of American reluctance with respect to Vietnam's membership in the United Nations.

presence in central and southern Europe and in Japan in 1945–1946.

The Paris documents of 1972 and 1973 could facilitate a Vietnamese-American reconciliation and could even facilitate an effort to “account for the M.I.A.’s.” Indochina needs and at least Vietnam and Laos will accept foreign aid, and with it the foreign presence that accompanies such aid. It is imperative to American interests that the aid come from the United States rather than from China or the Soviet Union. Because of the availability of exportable surpluses in capital and goods, the United States remains the most dependable source of aid. Technical assistance agreements signed in Moscow in late 1975 assuring loans and personnel from the U.S.S.R. for the Vietnamese five year plan of 1976–1980 and the notable lack of warmth in Chinese-Vietnamese relations (and the lack of Chinese economic and technical surplus) emphasize the need for early American action.⁶ It is consistent with long-term Vietnamese policies that aid from the most distant source is the most desirable; furthermore, independence from the weight of Chinese pressures is a national goal. This was made clear at the August, 1976, meeting of the so-called non-aligned group in Colombo. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in his speech to the conference, expressed his government’s desire “to develop ties with the capitalist countries and normal diplomatic relations with the United States.”⁷ In the spring of 1976, Vietnam invited American oil companies to submit proposals for the development of offshore oil to the Vietnamese government. Conversely, an example of American intransigence with respect to Vietnam was the unsuccessful struggle of the United States to prevent Vietnam from joining the International Monetary Fund, unsuccessful because the United States has no veto in this body.⁸

Another obstacle to the normalization of United States relations with Vietnam was the linking of United Nations membership for Vietnam with the admission of the Republic of Korea. This reflected that mythology with respect to Southeast Asia that identified the politico/military problem of Indochina with Korea. This is a miscalculation of serious proportions and distorts American policy vis à vis both areas. Each nation of the third world must be regarded as a separate identity, obsessed and probably confused by indigenous problems and by internally designed responses to foreign pressures. The Korean situation must not dominate United States relations with Indochina. An American presence must be restored in Indochina and connections between Vietnam and the United States must be strengthened. Thus the United States should advance its prestige in Indochina and in the third world by *sponsoring*, rather than opposing, United Nations membership for Vietnam.⁹ To build an American presence in

Southeast Asia, especially in its Marxist-oriented segments, we must work with increasing harmony with our former victims.

CAMBODIA

United States relations with Cambodia (Kampuchea) remain in limbo. The American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, which resulted in the virtual destruction of the institutional rhythm and the modern facilities of the Khmer society, overshadows all negotiations.¹⁰ The Khmer remain aloof from their neighbors and, in their ancient tradition, strengthen their uniqueness while carrying out physical and institutional restoration amid an ongoing apprehension of Vietnamese and Thai ambitions.

As recently as the first annual celebration of the end of American-provoked violence in Cambodia in April, 1976, the new Head of State, Khieu Samphan, pilloried the United States government for causing the distress and chronic weakness of his country, and for using the Khmer as pawns in American intrigue in Indochina.

In May and June, 1975, the United States Agency for International Development Mission and other American installations in Laos were invaded and looted; and their organizations were pressed to leave Laos. Chief among the activists were the students of the Royal Lao Institute of Law and Administration. Shortly after this vandalism occurred, with the contents of both public and private American buildings and storehouses distributed among the looters, the United States withdrew its AID Mission and cut its diplomatic representation to a skeleton force headed by a chargé d'affaires. Relations continue in a holding pattern. So ended an American practice of 25 years of paying—literally—all the bills for foreign purchases by the government of Laos. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma had correctly identified USAID as “a state within a state, a parallel administration to the Lao administration.”

Within weeks, however, following the final undisguised assumption of authority by the Pathet Lao, Pathet Lao leaders were complaining about the withdrawal of the goodies that had so long been provided by the United States. While still Premier, even Souvanna Phouma wondered aloud why the looting and the insults, combined with the expulsion of the AID Mission, had upset “such a rich and powerful country,” as he joined with the Pathet Lao in expressing hope that American aid would resume and that

¹⁰ Indelibly engraved in Cambodian history is the incredible statement of President Nixon's 18 months after the American invasion of Cambodia, “Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form,” a statement offered during a press conference on November 12, 1971, when Nixon “explained” the value and the necessity of the Cambodian invasion.

“American friendship” would continue. Unless foreign assistance from some source is restored, obviously, the Lao cannot live in a style approaching that condition of life to which at least the handful of aristocrats and businessmen had become accustomed through long years of American financial transfusions.

The United States is equipped emotionally and in terms of its operating systems to encourage the development of an authentic regionalism in Southeast Asia. Without such a regional development, the area will continue to be peculiarly vulnerable to outside interference and internal turmoil that is inimical to the United States and to an institutional structure that can communicate with American institutions.

There is evidence from all the societies in Southeast Asia that an American presence, even a modified military identity in areas outside Indochina, would not be unwelcome if it can be established under local control. In spite of post-World War II military intervention in Indochina and Thailand, Southeast Asian leaders seem to be far less fearful of the United States than their speeches usually indicate. Thus, after American compliance with the Thai-initiated requests for the withdrawal of American troops, planes, and other equipment, the Thai elections of April, 1976, returned a moderate government, still shadowed by the military elements holding real power behind the scenes. The new leadership volunteered that it would consider renegotiating an agreement with the United States, obviously to modify the precipitousness of the American exit. Premier Seni Pramoj observed: “The United States Government has helped us for many, many years, and I consider the United States a long-time friend of Thailand.” This at a time when Thailand, having restored diplomatic relations with China, was negotiating a similar exchange of diplomatic intercourse with her Indochinese neighbors. Indonesia is continuing to hope for and to expect United States aid and is scheduling large military purchases from the United States.

During 1976, Hanoi apparently abandoned caustic expressions of contempt for ASEAN. In July, diplomatic relations were established between Hanoi and Manila, during the visit to Manila of a Vietnamese delegation. A reciprocal agreement established the fact that neither the Philippines nor Vietnam “would allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention

(Continued on page 225)

L. Edward Shuck, Jr., has taught in Indonesia and the Philippines and has served as a representative of the Asia Foundation and as a political officer for the United States Department of State in Venezuela. He served in 1974 as visiting professor of government at National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan on a National Science Council/Fulbright Grant.

In Thailand, "moves toward democracy under civilian leadership came to an end on October 6, 1976, when a new military regime seized the government. . . . Perhaps economic and security conditions will improve under the new military regime. The growing desire of an increasing number of Thai people for more individual freedom, however, will continue to present a problem."

Thailand: Return to Military Rule

BY FRANK C. DARLING
Professor of Political Science, DePauw University

THAILAND is again involved in a familiar scenario in its political history. For almost 30 years, powerful military leaders like Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, General Phao Sriyanon, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphat Charusathien intermittently abolished constitutions, dissolved legislatures, censored the press, restricted civil liberties, imprisoned political opponents, and imposed martial law with the excuse that subversive threats in adjacent societies made these democratic institutions weak and impractical.¹ They also blocked constitutional reforms because of their intense desire to maintain strong centralized control. In considerable degree, this policy was closely linked to the United States policy of containment in Southeast Asia. For 25 years, Thailand received sizable quantities of United

States military and economic aid because she was regarded as a "bastion of freedom" in this strategic region.²

This trend was greatly altered by the student uprising in October, 1973, that toppled one of the most entrenched military regimes in Thailand, and by the North Vietnamese military victory over the Republic of Vietnam in April, 1975, which led to the establishment of Communist governments in all of Indochina.³ The student uprising in Thailand etched a deep psychological scar on the sensitive collective consciousness of the Thai people and discouraged a quick return to military rule. The student uprising and the downfall of the military likewise launched the Thai political system on the rocky path toward parliamentary democracy. This constitutional trend contrasted markedly with the movement toward authoritarianism elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world; it comprised a change that was not deflected by the formation of totalitarian regimes in Cambodia and Laos and the unification of Vietnam under a Communist government.

For a time the presence of Communist societies in adjacent countries actually strengthened democracy in Thailand. The increased exposure and vulnerability to Communist infiltration did not cause the Thai government to seek closer military ties with the United States. Instead, the new civilian leadership moved as rapidly and as tactfully as possible toward a broader array of international relationships and some form of "nonalignment."

¹ See Michael L. Mezey, "The 1971 Coup in Thailand: Understanding Why the Legislature Fails," *Asian Survey* (March, 1973), pp. 306-17.

² For scholarly discussions of American policy in Thailand see Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 105-269; David A. Wilson, *The United States and the Future of Thailand* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), chaps. 1, 2, 8, 9.

³ For detailed data and interpretations of the October, 1973, student uprising in Thailand see Ruth-Inge Heinze, "Ten Days in October—Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand," *Asian Survey* (June, 1974), pp. 491-508; Robert F. Zimmerman, "Student 'Revolution' in Thailand: The End of the Thai Bureaucratic Polity?" *Asian Survey* (June, 1974), pp. 509-29; Justice M. van der Kroef, "Thailand After Thanom," *Asian Affairs* (January/February, 1974), pp. 170-83.

⁴ For an analysis of the January, 1975, elections and the formation of Kukrit's government see Jeffrey Race, "The January 1975 Thai Elections: Preliminary Data and Inferences," *Asian Survey* (April, 1975), pp. 375-81; Robert F. Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975: Transition to Constitutional Democracy Continues," *Asian Survey* (February, 1976), pp. 159-72; David Morell, "Political Conflict in Thailand," *Asian Affairs* (January/February, 1976), pp. 151-84.

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS

A significant step toward parliamentary democracy was taken by the first government formed after the national elections in January, 1975, and headed by Kukrit Pramoj.⁴ In spite of enormous internal prob-

lems and ominous political developments in Indochina, Kukrit provided an element of stability and sophistication at a crucial time. His conservatism and experience in government made him acceptable to powerful rightist groups, and his previous role as Thailand's leading journalist and a long-time advocate of political and economic reform won him support from liberal and leftist activists. Kukrit's humor and wit also made him popular with the general public. As the new Communist regimes emerged in Indochina, he personally traveled to Peking and established diplomatic relations with Communist China. He publicly protested the unauthorized landing of American marines on Thai soil during the *Mayaguez* affair, but tactfully reaffirmed his government's desire to retain good relations with the United States shortly thereafter.⁵

To cope with increasing domestic demands for a more equitable distribution of wealth, Kukrit's Cabinet established a program allocating 500,000 baht (\$25,000) to each of the 5,000 *tambon* or district councils in the kingdom, with the provision that each council could decide on the use of these public funds for local improvements without the traditional interference from the central government. Kukrit also advocated a "rice premium" program that would have raised the income of rural peasants by a modest increase in food prices for urban dwellers in Bangkok.

The *Christian Science Monitor* called Kukrit's performance a "tricky balancing act."⁶ It lasted exactly 299 days, until January 9, 1976. The loose coalition of 17 political parties supporting the Kukrit government began to disintegrate as it pushed for more controversial actions. The first Prime Minister elected under the 1974 constitution accordingly decided to dissolve the lower house and hold new national elections. Kukrit's own party, the Social Action party, controlled only 18 seats in the 269-member legislature. Other parties in his coalition, like the Social Justice party and the Thai Nation party, had much larger blocs of representatives. There were other reasons for the downfall of Kukrit's government. According to Morell:

There were too many political parties; too little commitment to stability; too many demands for rapid change from the left, and too much concern for the status quo from the right; an overemphasis on personality, and an unwillingness to compromise.⁷

The political campaign for the elections held on April 4, 1976, was waged by 2,370 candidates from 39

political parties for 279 seats in the new National Assembly.⁸ This campaign was marred by an increase in disruptions and violence. The growing polarization of Thai society—largely Bangkok society—resulted in serious injury and death to an increasing number of political participants. Several right-wing members of the militant Red Gaur movement injured themselves permanently when they attempted to bomb the headquarters of the moderate-left New Force party. Boonsanong Bunyathayan, the American-educated Secretary-General of the Socialist party of Thailand, was shot to death near his Bangkok home by unknown assailants.⁹

The voter turnout for the April, 1976, election was about 40 percent of the eligible electorate, which was 7 percent less than the turnout in the previous elections held in January, 1975. The results of the elections were as follows:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Candidates</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Democrat	260	114
Thai Nation	215	56
Social Action	234	45
Social Justice	203	28
Social Agrarian	76	9
Social Nationalist	100	8
New Force	204	3
People's Force	151	3
Socialist Party of Thailand	125	2
Provincial Development	6	2

In addition, ten other political parties won single seats in the national legislature. Twenty smaller parties active in the campaign received no seats.

In spite of the violence and controversy generated by the April, 1976, election, the party system in Thailand showed significant signs of increasing maturity and strength. The total of 39 political parties competing in the 1976 elections was down slightly from the total of 44 parties that had competed in the 1975 elections. More important was the growing concentration of electoral support in four major political parties. The Democrat, Thai Nation, Social Action, and Social Justice parties, which received double-digit representation in the new lower house, ran a total of 912 candidates, almost 40 percent of the total number of office-seekers; yet they won 243 seats, 85 percent of the total number of elected representatives. The Democrat party won a landslide victory in Bangkok and in many provinces and clearly emerged as the leading political party in the kingdom. The growing concentration of electoral support in a few political parties and the elimination of numerous splinter parties augured well for increasing political stability in Thailand.

The April, 1976, elections also had some interesting surprises and caused several unexpected changes in Thai politics. The Social Action party led by Kukrit Pramoj increased its representation in the

⁵ *Bangkok Post*, May 15, 1975.

⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 16, 1975.

⁷ Morell, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁸ "News From Home," April 1-30, 1976, Office of the Public Relations Attaché, The Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, D.C.

⁹ *Bangkok Post*, March 1, 1976.

lower house from 18 to 45 seats, but Kukrit himself was defeated. The Dusit district in Bangkok where he ran for office contained large numbers of military personnel and their families, who voted heavily for more conservative candidates. The elections also showed a decidedly rightist trend among the Thai people, caused in considerable degree by increased threats from Communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The election likewise enabled strong military leaders to maintain considerable political power through a legal and open channel. Powerful military figures like Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasap, Major General Pramarn Adireksarn, and Major General Chatichai Choonthavan easily won election in the National Assembly and gained important positions in the new Cabinet.

All leftist and socialist parties, on the other hand, fared very poorly. Their total representation in the new lower house was three seats, down from 25 seats in the 1975 elections. Socialist and leftist candidates suffered heavily from the drastic decline in voter sentiment in the economically depressed provinces in northeastern Thailand that had previously given them considerable electoral support. Adverse events in Laos—especially the forced abolition of the 600-year-old monarchy—combined with frequent news of the Communist suppression of the Laotian people, led voters in the northeastern provinces to vote for conservative and rightist candidates. One of the major surprises of the election was the performance of the moderate-leftist New Force party, which fielded a total of 204 candidates, many with advanced academic degrees from universities in the United States. The widely publicized idealism and enthusiasm of this recently organized party aroused much attention during the campaign. Yet it won only 3 seats, down from 12 seats in the 1975 election. The representation of leftist and socialist parties in the new legislature was the lowest in the entire post-World War II period, a condition caused not by the suppression of right-wing military leaders but by the voting preferences of the Thai people.

On April 30, 1976, the leader of the Democrat party, Seni Pramoj, formed a new Cabinet that won overwhelming approval from the newly organized National Assembly.¹⁰ Like his younger brother, Seni also brought considerable sophistication and experi-

ence to the office of Prime Minister. He was educated at Trent College and Oxford University in Great Britain, and he engaged in a successful law practice for many years. He served as the Thai Minister to the United States during World War II, and was the leader of the Free Thai movement that cooperated closely with Allied military forces operating against the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia. Seni was appointed Prime Minister for a few months after World War II to handle sensitive diplomatic negotiations with the British and the French, who were seeking to restore their interests and power in the region. He joined the Democrat party in its early years and contributed to its long record of opposition to authoritarian military rule.

Like Kukrit, Seni was a royalist and a close confidant of the King. He was also a moderate conservative seeking to establish constitutional democracy in Thailand. Yet while his younger brother had relied heavily on his colorful and dynamic personality to enhance his political role, Seni depended largely on the prestige and strength of his political party. Instead of the vigor and lucidity of Kukrit's talents as a journalist, Seni gave the Thai government the circumspection and perseverance of an experienced lawyer. He also gave it a certain drift and indecisiveness.

The portfolios in Seni's Cabinet were allotted among the four largest political parties (excluding the Social Action party) in rough proportion to their representation in the National Assembly. Some members of the new government had also served in the previous Cabinet. The Democrat party took over the leadership of key ministries, like foreign affairs, interior, communications, and commerce, with Seni assuming the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.¹¹ Leading military politicians were appointed to less important positions. General Pramarn Adireksarn was made Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, General Chatichai Choonthavan was appointed Minister of Industry, and Air Marshal Dawee Chullasap became Minister of Public Health. Yet to maintain a significant military role in the new government, Seni also selected General Pramarn and Marshal Dawee as Deputy Prime Ministers. The key portfolio of Minister of Defense was given to General Krit Siwan, the only appointed member of the new Cabinet. Krit was very popular with the Thai people, and he had gained enormous stature by providing political stability in the difficult period of democratic reforms following the student uprising in October, 1973. He died suddenly a few days after the formation of Seni's new government. The Ministry of Defense was headed by his deputy, General Tawit Seniwong Na Ayudhya.

The Seni government followed many of the policies of its predecessor. For a time, the new Cabinet con-

¹⁰ As the leader of the Democrat party, Seni had also formed a government shortly after the January, 1975, elections. His party won the largest bloc of seats (75) in the National Assembly, and his role as leader of the party made him the initial contender for the office of Prime Minister. Yet Seni failed to win a majority of the votes in the lower house for his Cabinet. Kukrit was asked to form a new government, which quickly won parliamentary approval.

¹¹ Press Release No. 5, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, June 10, 1976.

sidered the possibility of abolishing the controversial *tambon* program that was initiated by Kukrit's government to promote the development of the rural areas and to direct large public expenditures away from the metropolitan area in Bangkok. Yet after considerable pressure from within the ruling coalition, Seni decided to continue this financial assistance to rural districts. His government allotted 2,000 million baht (\$100 million) for rural development, although the spending of these public funds was supervised by provincial administrators under the guidance of the central government.¹² The new Cabinet started serious considerations of a land reform program similar in many ways to the rural developmental plans proposed by Kukrit's Cabinet. Seni's government also maintained the foreign policy started by his predecessor, seeking closer diplomatic relations with the Communist regimes in the region, closer contacts with the third world, and the preservation of friendly relations with the United States, Japan, and many Western nations.

A NEW MILITARY REGIME

These moves toward democracy under civilian leadership came to an end on October 6, 1976, when a new military regime seized the government, abolished the 1974 constitution, dissolved the national legislature, and imposed martial law. In the twelfth military coup since 1932, a new regime calling itself the Administrative Reform Committee established itself in power with Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu as its spokesman. The admiral had been sworn in as the new Minister of Defense by Prime Minister Seni Pramoj less than 24 hours before the coup.

The military seizure of power was precipitated by violence from leftist students at Thammasat University. These students were reacting to the return of former Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn to Thailand from political exile less than three weeks earlier. They barricaded themselves on the university campus. When they began firing at police officials, the new military leaders ordered a harsh suppression of the students, simultaneously ousting the members of the Seni government. Within a few hours, some 40 students were killed, about 200 students were wounded, and more than 3,000 were arrested. The strong police reaction was supplemented by brutal actions from vocational students who had been feuding with leftist students for more than two years. The new military government claimed that the leftist students at Thammasat University had received their weapons and directions from Communist sources.

Within a few days, the Administrative Reform

Committee appointed Thanin Kraiwichien, a 49-year-old justice of the Dika (Supreme) Court, as the new Prime Minister. Thanad Khoman, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs who had opposed the swift removal of American military bases, was appointed as an adviser to the new government. At this writing in mid-October, 1976, the real source of power within the Administrative Reform Committee appeared to be a small group of army generals who had apparently been considering a military coup since January, 1976, when political opponents forced Kukrit Pramoj to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections. The power relationships within the new military government have not yet been clarified.

The Administrative Reform Committee has given little indication of any major changes in the policies of the Thai government. Admiral Chaloryu has stated that all treaty commitments with foreign governments will be maintained. There were some rumors of a possible return to closer military cooperation between Thailand and the United States, although American officials reported that a return to the former military program sponsored by the United States was very unlikely. The new government in Bangkok indicated that it would take a stronger stand against the Communist regimes in Indochina than the two previous civilian governments had taken.

It is still too soon to evaluate the extent of the military reaction against the leftists in Thailand. The swift and determined measures of the new military regime show that high-ranking military officers are no longer apprehensive of popular support for the university students, who had toppled the Thanom military government in October, 1973. In the past three years, the student movement in Thailand has become highly fragmented and polarized. Thus the military leaders were accompanied by their own student sympathizers as they undertook stern actions against the leftist students at Thammasat University.

At present, there are some indications that the military reaction may expand beyond the suppression of the university students suspected of cooperating with internal or external Communist organizations.* Some

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¹² *The Nation*, June 11, 1976.

* On October 20, the government announced that it had arrested 4,000 people on suspicion of being Communists.

"With each passing year, the novelty of martial-law rule dims, the overly optimistic hopes of the democratic revolution fade, and the most basic, formidable and apparently insoluble problems of the Philippines doggedly persist."

The Philippines under Martial Law

BY ROBERT O. TILMAN
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ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1976, the Republic of the Philippines celebrated its fourth year of martial-law rule under the guidance of Ferdinand Marcos, twice elected in his own right (1965 and 1969) and at one time a political leader of unusual popularity.¹ At the time of the official declaration of martial law, Marcos attributed his drastic action to an insidious insurgent movement that had grown to such proportions that the weakened foundations of the Philippine democracy were in imminent danger of collapse. Later explanations, however, played down the significance of any specific insurgent threat and spoke more broadly of the corruptive influence of colonialism, the resulting decay of Filipino society, and the inappropriateness of the imported American-style political system. Within a few weeks after the imposition of martial law, Marcos was speaking almost daily of the "democratic revolution" and a resulting "new society," both of which he viewed as the products of his extra-constitutional regime.

Ferdinand Marcos may have had personal motivation for seeking to continue in office, but there is much validity in his argument that the Philippines in 1972 faced a difficult future. As a result of more than 300 years of Spanish colonialism, Filipinos—alone among Asians—are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. After 50 years of American colonialism, the Philippine Republic was left with the largest mass education system, the most extensive media networks, and the most literate population in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, some related side effects of the American colonial period were less desirable: unplanned urban crowding,

massive overeducation and underemployment, and a mental outlook among many Filipinos that glorified things Western and belittled indigenous ideas, products and accomplishments. In short, by the time the United States severed its colonial ties with the Philippines on July 4, 1946, the Philippine Republic was cut off from its Asian heritage and was wandering in an alien Southeast Asian landscape where its leaders sometimes felt very much out of place and almost painfully ill at ease.

To complicate its difficulties, the Philippines had not even begun to recover from the devastation of World War II when independence came in 1946. The economy and the socioeconomic infrastructure were in shambles as a result of the Japanese invasion and occupation of 1942–1945, and the American reoccupation in late 1944 and early 1945 in the face of stiff Japanese resistance. Corruption has always been a problem for the Philippines, because social constraints familiar to Westerners are weakened by Filipino familialism and other aspects of Filipino culture. But it reached new heights in the chaos and deprivation of the immediate postwar era. By 1972, corruption had become firmly institutionalized as an aspect of life at all levels of Philippine society, particularly among those most vulnerable to the temptations of corruption—the government officials themselves.

Until September, 1972, politics was as much a national pastime, or obsession, as it was a process by which leaders were chosen and issues were resolved. Each political faction owned and controlled its own media outlets. The newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, and the reporters and editorial writers who worked for them, rarely tried to present objective reporting of any news about their owners and managers or their political opponents. Each was an advocate for a particular issue or, more likely, a particular personality. Moneyed interests had ties to factional groups, and while some were careful to

¹ The dating of the beginning of martial law varies in reports from September 21 to September 23. The martial-law proclamation apparently was signed by the President on September 21; the Executive Order implementing it was reportedly signed on the night of September 22; and the public announcement of martial law was made in the early morning hours of September 23. Thus, each of the three dates may be used.

hedge their bets by supporting several factions simultaneously, most knowledgeable observers knew who was tied to whom and to what extent. At a lower level, one-to-one ties of mutual indebtedness were cemented by bonds of marriage, kinship (real and *compadre*), language, and region. Even if there were no tie, a voter might sell his indebtedness to ambitious politicians at the polls for a few or many *pesos*, the exact price depending on the resources of the candidate, the importance of the election, and the probability of winning or losing. Politics and the discussion of political maneuverings permeated virtually all aspects of Philippine life from the *barrio* coffee shop to the Presidential Palace.

At no time was politics more all-consuming than in the second election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1969. No Philippine President had ever been elected to a second full term, and Marcos was determined not to confirm what was by then a fairly widespread belief that the reelection of a full-term incumbent President was impossible. In his zeal to break the cycle with an overwhelming mandate, Marcos hid from view many of the more pessimistic indicators of the state of the nation's health. If optimistic indicators did not exist, they could be—and were—invented by government officials and disseminated by friendly members of the media.

Marcos won easily, but the 1969 election was costly in many ways. It was one of the most expensive elections in Philippine history, probably the most expensive, and many of the funds had come from the public treasury. It was also one of the most disillusioning elections, because most of the optimism generated in the course of the long campaign was patently unfounded. In fact, the transition from "Marcos means progress" (a popular campaign slogan) to Marcos means "sacrifice" (a frequently voiced theme after the January, 1970, inauguration of the President) was almost too rapid to allow Filipinos time to adjust.

In the context of student riots, strikes, resurgent unrest in Luzon, a Muslim revolt in the south, and natural disasters (earthquakes, typhoons, floods, droughts, all of which are common in the Philippines), the second Marcos administration was increasingly threatened. Martial law for Manila had long been a popular topic for discussion in Manila

coffeehouses, and it probably came close to realization at the height of the student unrest in early 1970. Martial law for all the Philippines was sometimes brought up, but few thought the Filipino people would be willing to cool their passion for politics. Thus, while some observers discovered the inevitability of martial law retrospectively, most were genuinely surprised by the President's actions on the night of September 22, 1972.

THE MARTIAL-LAW REGIME

Why did Filipinos accept the imposition of martial law with such equanimity? To be sure, the coup was carefully planned and efficiently implemented: the hundreds of persons arrested in the initial hours of martial law helped to reduce the possibility of resistance, just as Marcos's immediate move against the mass media prevented popular mobilization of support against the move. However, even in demonstration-prone Manila, martial law triggered no spontaneous outbursts against the usurpation of power. Quite obviously, Filipinos were not prepared to man the barricades in defense of a system in which many of them had been actively involved. Most scholars and participants had long believed that Filipinos were too accustomed to political involvement to permit themselves to be deprived of it. But the President demonstrated, first, that the roots of the existing system were not deep, and, more important, that most Filipinos had tired of a turgid and enervating political game that produced ever diminishing returns to the majority of the participants. In short, the President understood the mood of the Filipino people far better than most of his critics.

Within the context of a "new society" achieved through the "democratic revolution," in his domestic reforms Marcos proposed to redistribute the country's wealth, instill a new feeling of pride in being Filipino, break the bonds of traditional familism, and integrate the country's ethnic and cultural minorities into the Filipino nation. In foreign affairs, he spoke of his desire to foster an Asian identity, to forge a foreign policy stance less dependent on the United States and more flexible toward the Communist states, and to gain acceptance by the Philippines' neighbors.

This ambitious program of reform, which was actually revealed piecemeal over a period of several years, was and continues to be implemented by a martial-law administration grafted on top of traditional bureaucratic and military organizations. In legal terms, Marcos is now ruling in a "transitional period" between the demise of the old American-style constitution with a presidential form of government and the new parliamentary system approved by the Constitutional Convention only slightly more than a month after the declaration of martial law.²

² The Constitutional Convention (Con-Con, as it was commonly called in the Philippines) convened in June, 1971, for the purpose of rewriting the constitution inherited from the American commonwealth period of Philippine history (1935-1946). Its original goal was to complete its work in one year and submit the draft document to a national referendum in November, 1972. Con-Con was trumpeted as a non-political body, but virtually nothing could be non-political in the Philippines in 1971. As a result Con-Con immediately became bogged down in complex political bargaining and little progress had been made by the time martial law was proclaimed.

The exact duration of the transition is left by the constitution to the President himself, and in the interim he, in effect, has been made a constitutional dictator responsible only to an amorphous constituency called "the people," which actually leaves him responsible to virtually no one.

To permit the "people" to make their wishes known, Marcos established Citizens' Assemblies, which were grounded in the traditional institution of the *barangay*—a small community of Filipinos with supposedly common origins. The *barangay* assemblies were first called on to ratify the new constitution (the law called for a popular plebiscite but Marcos substituted the approval of the *barangay* assemblies) and were later employed on several occasions to provide Marcos with symbolic popular mandates for the continuation of martial law. While symbolic support has been derived from the people through the *barangay* assemblies and a national council of *barangay* leaders, the day-to-day political process is considerably more familiar.

Marcos has surrounded himself with able and apparently loyal technocrats, military officers responsible to him for their recently acquired promotions, appointed provincial officials serving at Marcos's pleasure, and trusted family and friends. In the last category, and deserving special attention, is Imelda Marcos, the wife of the President. The First Lady, and indeed the entire Remoulez family, have loomed larger in Philippine politics each year, a trend that began in the first Marcos administration and has accelerated greatly since the imposition of martial law. Imelda Marcos has frequently served as the President's personal emissary abroad, and in 1975 she was given her first governing position as governor of the new Province of Metropolitan Manila. In this capacity, she became the head of a consolidated administration of four cities and thirteen municipalities with a combined population of 5 million, or

some 10 percent of the total population of the Philippines. Under the "old society," the mayor of Manila was an important and influential political figure, and in the "new society," the governor of Metropolitan Manila is certainly no less significant. Many observers are guessing that this particular governor will prove to be far more important than any previous city mayor.

MARTIAL LAW: A FOUR YEAR ASSESSMENT

Ferdinand Marcos has repeatedly asserted that land reform is the cornerstone of his new society programs, and thus this seems an appropriate point to begin any assessment of his martial-law regime. Of course, assertions of the importance of land reform are not new in Philippine politics. In fact, almost every presidential hopeful traditionally included a land-reform plank in his political platform and usually tried to introduce some form of land legislation in the Congress. Within Congress, almost every legislator gave verbal support to land-reform policies, but the laws enacted were usually toothless. Even if a mildly effective bill slipped through the landlord-dominated Congress, specific cases had to be enforced by landowning bureaucrats, while disputes between tenants and landlords were espoused by landowning lawyers and adjudicated by landowning judges. Even if the tenant understood his rights and had the resources to pursue his claim, neither of which was likely, the deck was stacked against him. In the Philippines, about nine-tenths of the land is owned by a few hundred families, and these are the same families who graduate from college, dominate Congress, hold top-level administrative and judicial appointments, own and operate the media, and provide most of the funds to support political campaigns.³

When Ferdinand Marcos dissolved Congress and halted elections, he placed all government servants in a position of being ultimately obligated to him. At least in theory, it was then possible to formulate and implement a stiff land-reform program, for landlords were no longer a serious obstacle. In practice, of course, Ferdinand Marcos still had to tend his constituencies, for no strong man can remain in power in the face of concerted opposition on the part of persons with wealth and connections.

The martial-law, land-reform program has had its critics.⁴ And there is no doubt that official rhetoric has far outdistanced concrete accomplishments and that Marcos has broken up only a fraction of the large holdings. However, since 1972, he has been able to move much more determinedly than he could have moved under the old system that practically guaranteed immunity to all landowners. One sympathetic appraisal⁵ reports that while in the decade prior to the imposition of martial law an average of 14,825 tenants per year became leasees, in the first

³ Estimates vary widely depending on the motives of the authors. The most radical estimates are that about 40 families control 90 percent of the national wealth (and land is still the most important asset in a country that is 75 percent agrarian). The more conservative estimates would place the number of families at about 10 times the above figure. In either case, many of the same families, all tied to large land holdings, have constantly reappeared in Philippine economic, political, cultural, and intellectual history.

⁴ For strong criticism, see Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "Land Reform in the Philippines Since the Marcos Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 47 (fall, 1974), pp. 286-304. For a critique that is flawed only by the absence of a statistical evaluation of land-reform accomplishments, see William H. Overholt, "Land Reform in the Philippines," *Asian Survey*, vol. 16 (May, 1976), pp. 427-51.

⁵ José C. Medina, Jr., "The Philippine Experience with Land Reform," *SEADAG Papers*, no. 75-3 (New York: SEADAG, 1975, mimeo.). Marcos's land-reform program is based in part on a land-reform act of 1963. Thus, the decade 1963 through September, 1972, is often used as the standard for appraising post-martial-law achievements.

three years of martial law, the average figure rose to 64,812. In conversion to ownership, the same figures report a 648-percent increase. Marcos has achieved greater redistribution of land than was possible under the old society, but the gross inequities in the distribution of wealth, which traditionally have been imbedded in the structure of landownership, remain a major problem.

President Marcos also must contend with armed uprisings, although recently some improvement may have taken place. A new generation of the old Huk movement creates considerable mischief in Luzon north of Manila, and its more effective and more ideologically oriented descendant, the New People's Army, is causing much greater concern. By 1976, the NPA had spread its influence from the traditional "Huklandia" sanctuary to the central and southern sections of the Philippines. The capture of one of the leaders of these new "Huks," Commander Dante (Bernabe Buscanyo) on August 26, 1976, and the revelation by the government at the same time that another important leader, Victor Corpus, had fallen into government hands six months earlier, seem to be significant victories for the martial-law regime, although the importance of the two leaders to the movement is questioned by many of Marcos's critics. In the deep south, the wars continue between Muslims and Christians, traditional land-occupiers and modern titleholders, separatists and the central government, and other contending groups out to settle old scores. The 1976 Easter weekend was one of the worst for government forces in the south in recent years, despite the fact that the commander of the southern command (Southcom) is reported to have about 100,000 men under his command.⁶ With the dethronement of Tun Mustapha in neighboring Sabah in late 1975, the generally acknowledged but officially unsupported flow of arms and ammunition into the southern back door of the Philippines seems to have stopped. This interruption of outside logistical support, combined with the natural disasters that overtook Mindanao and Sulu in 1976, seems to have reduced the level of the armed conflict, although the root problems are still unresolved and it remains to be seen whether there is a winding down of the war or only a temporary lull in the fighting. In either case, martial law seems to deserve only partial credit.

Marcos's assertion that he wants to create a united Filipino nation has led to the removal of many obstacles preventing resident Philippine-Chinese from gaining local citizenship. The recognition of the People's Republic of China and the breaking of re-

lations with the Republic of China have resulted in the severing of ties between the Kuomintang and the several hundred Chinese language schools. The severing of these ties also preceded the almost immediate Filipinization of all alien educational institutions. At the same time, Ferdinand Marcos has attempted to neutralize the decidedly pro-Kuomintang leanings of the Chinese business communities; under the provisions of martial law, he has permitted only those Chinese newspapers sympathetic to his goals to publish. The Chinese have not flocked in droves to take advantage of the liberalized citizenship provisions, and many respected Chinese residents remain highly skeptical of the President. It is, nevertheless, evident that under martial law the Chinese have been given the opportunity to move more decisively toward social and political integration into Filipino life. Many Chinese (and some foreign observers) resent such integration, but if it is accepted as desirable (and most Filipino politicians have paid lip service to such sentiments for decades), then President Marcos's accomplishments in this area must be recognized.

Marcos's moves in the international arena have also signaled his intention to break with the past. The ending of "parity" privileges in 1974 (a practice whereby American investors and landowners were treated forensically as Filipinos and thus held constitutional rights denied to other foreigners) was expected, but other policies and policy pronouncements were more surprising.⁷ Marcos followed the United States lead with an expeditious and thorough rapprochement with China. Certainly, Marcos's recognition of and diplomatic exchanges with the People's Republic of China in June, 1975, together with the severing of the Philippines' formerly intimate ties with Taiwan, went considerably further than most would have thought possible several years earlier. Similarly, Marcos's outburst against United States bases in the Philippines after the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975 seemed out of character and left many persons surprised. The more sympathetic stance the President took after his 1975 visit to China and the resulting discussions between the two countries that have been under way since seem much more typical of Philippine foreign policy.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that Ferdinand Marcos
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⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 14, 1976.

⁷ For a contrary interpretation of the "revolutionary" nature of the new society—the view that martial law supports, and was supported by, foreign investors—see Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of a Coup: Transnational Linkages and Philippine Political Responses," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 11 (1974), pp. 161-77.

"Politically, Burma is a country much shrouded in secrecy. Its leader of 14 years, however, is challenged today as never before and is clearly in danger of destruction at the hands of the very soldier class on which his power has rested."

The Burmese Way of Change

BY RICHARD BUTWELL

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SHORTLY AFTER General Ne Win overthrew elected Premier U Nu in 1962, he proclaimed a new economic order which he called the "Burmese way to socialism." Critical observers claimed that there was little that was distinctly Burmese about the Marxist course charted by the new leader, noting that it appeared to be modeled essentially after Russian and East European communism. When Ne Win proclaimed Burma a one-party socialist republic in 1974,¹ critics alleged that Communist institutions elsewhere had inspired the ex-military leader and that the new governing arrangements were Burmese in name only.

However accurate such judgments are, they do not mean that there is not a very distinctly Burmese way of change, which can be described as indirect, halting, and often forced, whether by circumstances or guns. At no time has this been more dramatically demonstrated than in 1976—a year in which the country may have passed several points of no return. The persistence of certain Burmese patterns can be seen in the 14 years of Ne Win's largely one-man rule, in the political stewardship of Premier U Nu, and even in Burmese political development under British colonialism and the manner in which independence came in 1948, unexpectedly and largely unearned.

General Ne Win's succession to political leadership was a multiple step, indecisive and almost abortive process. Through emissaries, Ne Win told Nu in 1958 that he was taking over the government, only

to be told by Nu that he could not do so for a month to avoid the impression of a coup d'état.² Ne Win subsequently assumed control of the government, but resigned after 18 months, ostensibly to allow a restoration of civilian rule. Two years of ineffective civilian governance were followed by the general's return to power in a lightning-like coup against U Nu on March 2, 1962.

Ne Win struggled for 12 more years, from 1962 to 1974, to find a fitting form for his new one-party rule, a unitary "socialist republic" with the country's number two soldier General San Yu in charge of the ruling Burma Socialist Program party.³ In Burma, political change comes slow step by slow step, over a usually lengthy period of time. And politics often takes decisive turns unintentionally—even producing consequences almost the opposite of what was intended.

The pattern is not new. Burma fell to British rule in the second half of the nineteenth century, over a 50-year period as a result of three wars, the first provoked by a Burmese government that hardly foresaw the process it was setting in motion. In the 1930's, some Burmese nationalists opposed separation from India (of which Burma was a province under British colonialism until 1937), because they feared Burma would fall behind India in the pursuit of greater self-government.⁴ But the separation was accompanied by an accelerated liberalization of politics in Burma.

U Nu, first Premier after independence came in 1948, frankly admitted that he had not expected an end to colonial rule so soon. Nu himself had been elected to the Constituent Assembly only after the accidental death of an incumbent member; he became Prime Minister when the intended leader of a soon-to-be independent Burma (Aung San) and his top lieutenants were simultaneously assassinated in 1947. A true democrat, Nu made many political decisions during his two periods in power (1948–1958

¹ See *The Working People's Daily* (Rangoon), March 4, 1974.

² See the author's account in his *U Nu of Burma* rev. ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 206–207.

³ For an interesting evaluation, see Edwin W. Martin, "The Socialist Republic of Burma: How Much Change?" *Asian Survey* (February, 1975), pp. 129–135.

⁴ For background on Burmese nationalism, see my "Burmese Political Development: Impact of a Nationalist Heritage," in Michael Leiffer (ed.), *Nationalism, Revolution, and Evolution in South-East Asia* (Hull, England: Hull University South-East Asia Series No. 2, 1970).

and 1960–1962)⁵ that made almost inevitable the collapse of elected government in Burma. Nu's party won such a commanding victory in the free and fair 1960 elections that the chief opposition party had practically no representation in Parliament, although opposition was necessary to keep the government honest.

THE ABORTIVE 1976 PLOT

The plot that failed even before it could take place in 1976 is the most recent example of the operation of the Burmese political process. Fourteen junior officers, led by Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, conspired to unseat not only ex-General Ne Win, President of the new "socialist republic" since 1974, but also Defense Minister and heir apparent General San Yu and intelligence head Colonel Tin Oo.⁶ The young soldiers may have been admirers of another Tin Oo, a general and himself Defense Minister until his removal in March, 1976, in favor of San Yu. The plot failed because its participants did not realize that one officer whom they approached was loyal to Ne Win and would report the conspiracy to the nation's leader. The round-up of plot suspects began on July 2.

In announcing the discovery of the plot in mid-July, President Ne Win blamed it on a "worship of personality" cult, a reference to the alleged sympathy of the accused 11 captains and 3 majors for the dismissed General Tin Oo. Hundreds of army officers were subsequently reported under detention. But it is not likely that they were all partisans of the former Defense Minister, or that there were direct links between the fairly conspicuous General Tin Oo and the coup plotters (let alone a larger body of military personnel) in the kind of controlled Burma that Ne Win runs. Indeed, those who had knowledge of the conspiracy were probably not very numerous.

Until Tin Oo's dismissal in March, 1976, as Defense Minister and Chief of Staff, the comparatively colorless San Yu and the much more popular Tin Oo were generally regarded as the most likely successors to Ne Win. Both soldiers were known to have strong personal followings—with that of Tin Oo probably the larger. At the time of Tin Oo's removal, however, there were no signs of political resistance to the move, although Ne Win and San Yu had feared such a reaction.

Until very recently, Ne Win's popularity in the armed services has been high, which is one reason he has remained in power for such a long time. He was

perceived as a "soldier's general," always making sure that those in uniform—enlisted men as well as officers—received at least as many rewards as their civilian counterparts (and, usually, considerably more). By detaining substantial numbers of officers, however, Ne Win revealed his distrust of a large element of the armed class on which he depends for his political and possibly even his physical survival. This point has surely not been lost on many junior officers who were not even part of the 1976 plot. It is only a matter of time until the next plot is planned and, perhaps, successfully executed.

FIRST STEP TOWARD CHANGE

The development of potentially successful opposition to Ne Win is reflective of the Burmese way of change. There has been disenchantment within the general population for most of the 14 years that the ex-soldier has been in power. But opposition to Ne Win could not achieve its goal of a change of regimes because a united military monopolized political power and military force. The abortive 1976 coup may well turn out to have been the first serious step toward Ne Win's removal; it revealed, for all to see, a soldier class divided internally.

President Ne Win, however, may not be soon removed, although such a possibility should not be ruled out. The difficulty in evaluating the durability of the present Burmese regime is the network of controls that have so far kept all would-be noninsurgent opposition a state secret. In all probability, it will take several attempts to unseat the tough and egocentric Ne Win. It may well be, however, that the 1976 conspiracy was not in fact the first such move of its kind.⁷

In any event, Ne Win will probably not be removed from office by peaceful means. He will hold on to power as long as he can, and then he will be toppled by force. All real changes of government in Burma in modern times have been by force: the establishment of British rule, the World War II substitution of a Japanese colonial presence, the forced British departure from the country after the war, the assassination of Aung San and the other martyrs in 1947 (and U Nu's unexpected elevation to the premiership), and Ne Win's two successful coups to oust Nu. Force is the Burmese way of change, and it is probably destined to play itself out at least one more time. Ne Win's 1974 constitution and the new structure of government made no alteration at all in the basic realities of Burmese politics.

GROWING INSURGENCIES

The importance of Burma's multifaceted insurrections in determining who rules the country may well be more psychological than political. Burma was plagued by insurgency even before independence was

⁵ See the author's "The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premiership," *Asian Survey*, March, 1962.

⁶ *The New York Times*, July 21, 1976.

⁷ For an excellent analysis of this subject, see "Burmese Coup Try Raises Question of Ne Win's Power" by Robert Kilborn, Jr., in the *Christian Science Monitor*, July 22, 1976.

formally obtained, and in 1949–1951, the survival of U Nu's democratic civilian government was seriously threatened. In subsequent years, the various revolts, including two led by rival Communist factions, were contained.

In 1967, however, the predominant "White Flag" Communist party shifted the main area of its operations to the northeastern corner of the country, and the major insurgency threat to the Ne Win regime has come from that region in recent years. The Communists in the northeast probably number less than 10,000 men, compared with Burma's 130,000-soldier army, but they have received political encouragement and significant arms assistance from Communist China, with which Burma shares a more than 1,000-mile long common border.⁸ Government control in this part of the land has been virtually nonexistent since the early 1970's, a fact that has had serious external as well as internal implications for the Rangoon regime. Beginning in 1973, the Communists steadily expanded the area under their political control in the northeastern corner of the country.

In 1975, for the first time, the Burmese Communists crossed the strategic Salween River to compete in a major military action. Abandoning the hit-and-run approach that had been their hallmark, they endeavored, albeit unsuccessfully, to seize key Tanya township. Despite this particular setback, the Communist guerrillas were able to step up the intensity of their warfare against the government during 1975 and (also, for the first time) to continue their operations into the monsoon season. Both sides suffered some of their highest casualties in more than two decades of internal warfare in the country. In 1975, the government announced the pacification of the former heartland of Communist insurgent strength in the Pegu Yoma mountain range northeast of Rangoon.⁹

In 1976, the nature of the conflict between the

⁸ Sino-Burmese relations are well analyzed by Wayne Bert in his "Chinese Relations with Burma and Indonesia," *Asian Survey* (June, 1975).

⁹ See Edwin W. Martin, "Burma in 1975: New Dimensions to Non-Alignment," *Asian Survey* (February, 1976), pp. 174–175.

¹⁰ See *Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1976.

¹¹ An excellent analysis is found in an article by Mohan Ram, "Chinese Influence in Burma Increases," in the *Christian Science Monitor*, December 3, 1975.

¹² See Bruce Palling's story on this subject in the *Washington Post*, July 13, 1976.

¹³ For a different perspective, see James Harriman, "The Knives Are Out for Ne Win," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 30, 1976), pp. 13–14.

¹⁴ See Robert Kilborn, Jr.'s article in the *Christian Science Monitor*, July 22, 1976.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, April 1, 1976.

¹⁶ For a good review, see Mya Maung, "Military Management of the Burmese Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Josef Silverstein (ed.), *The Future of Burma in Perspective* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1974).

regime and the armed Communist opposition may have taken on a different color, if an allegation in the government-controlled press was accurate. The Ne Win administration suggested that its insurgent adversaries were using Communist Vietnamese-supplied surplus arms left behind by the Americans in Indochina.¹⁰ There was no independent verification of the claim. If Hanoi were sending aid, it would be very much out of step with the new Hanoi line, which apparently sought to improve ties with the other non-Communist governments of the area—including such outspokenly anti-Communist regimes as those of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Ne Win government's charge that Communist Vietnamese arms were aiding its Communist rebels, already assisted by Peking,¹¹ was probably designed to develop nationalist support for its own survival. Karen, Kachin, Shan and less numerous ethnic minorities continued insurrectionary activity in 1976 and, in some areas, such activities were significantly expanded. In July, representatives of nine non-Communist minorities established a new "National Democratic Front," the most recent "front" of this type established in opposition to Ne Win. This time, however, the "front" called on the United States and China for aid in its effort to topple the Rangoon regime.¹²

Clearly, Burma remains a divided nation: soldiers versus civilians, democrats versus one-party socialists, Communists versus nationalists, minorities versus the majority Burmans and, in 1976 for the first time, soldiers versus soldiers.¹³ It should be remembered that various peoples who inhabit Burma had warred chronically before the establishment of British colonial rule in the nineteenth century, and that they joined in a most precarious union to obtain independence after World War II. The Communists and other insurgents do not pose any immediate threat to the Ne Win regime and are probably far less a threat than the growing dissension within junior ranks of the army itself.¹⁴ The Rangoon regime's attempt to wave the "red flag" of Communist Vietnamese aid to Burma's Communists is probably an effort to mobilize nationalist support on behalf of an increasingly unpopular leader.¹⁵ The intensity of Burmese nationalism notwithstanding, this political move will probably fail. Vietnam is a devil few Burmese know. Ne Win is a leader they know; and many of them do not like him.

ECONOMIC STAGNATION

"The Burmese way to socialism," proclaimed by Ne Win when he seized power in 1962, also reflects the Burmese "way of change," often accomplishing almost the opposite of intended results. Although Ne Win rules a self-professed socialist regime, Burma was the only socialist country without an economic plan until 1971.¹⁶ In the years 1962–1974, before the proclama-

tion of the new "socialist republic" and the revision that same year of the first four year plan, Burma's total production increased at a very modest rate and her per capita income was one of the lowest in the world. Nationalized industries and other nationalized sectors of the economy, the fruits of Ne Win's economic policies, were largely unsuccessful; some of them showed declines in output while others were hard pressed to hold their own.

By 1974, the government had to modify some of its rigid economic policies. Restrictions on foreign investment were relaxed, and foreign participation in mining was permitted for the first time in a decade. Privately owned businesses, to which the government was strongly opposed ideologically, were allowed in certain fields.

Prices, meanwhile, rose 30 percent in 1975 and another 40 percent in 1976. By 1976, they were several hundred times higher than they had been when Ne Win seized control of the Burmese government in 1962. In 1975, in the largely peasant economy where most people do not work for wages, 30,000 Burmese were unemployed; this figure included 600 engineers and 400 doctors. Wages have remained static in recent years (averaging \$40 a month for industrial workers and \$32 for civil servants).

The terms of trade with the outside world also deteriorated in the middle 1970's. Imports increased in 1975, while exports declined in value, seriously worsening the chronically bleak balance-of-payments situation. By mid-1976, the balance of payments was nearly \$30 million in the red.¹⁷

On the whole, Burma's economy is weak (especially in comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia) but it has not collapsed. And the Ne Win government survived an almost unbelievable 14 years.

THE BLACK MARKET

Part of the explanation for the survival of Ne Win's government is the flourishing black market,¹⁸ possibly the world's most efficient and certainly one of its most necessary. Almost anything that can be bought in

¹⁷ See the article by Robert Kilborn, Jr., in the *Christian Science Monitor*, July 22, 1976.

¹⁸ Lewis H. Simons very accurately describes the Burmese black market in the *Washington Post*, May 31, 1976.

¹⁹ The smuggling of minerals like tin and zinc is an interesting aspect of this illegal trade. M. C. Tun treats one dimension of this in his article, "Clearing the Air of Smuggled Tin," in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 27, 1976, while Kyaw Min offers a distinctly Burmese view in the monthly magazine, *The Guardian* (Rangoon), May, 1976.

²⁰ A detailed, highly readable account of this development, by Henry Kamm appears in *The New York Times*, August 23, 1976.

²¹ Burma's circumstance, efforts, and prospects in the rice production and export area are treated by M. C. Tun, "Burma: Regaining Status as a Rice Exporter," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 19, 1975.

neighboring Thailand can be purchased in Burma for a price. Similarly, some of Burma's exports make their way out of the country in larger quantities clandestinely than legally—primarily, but not exclusively, overland to Thailand.

By 1976, probably 90 percent of the country's domestic commerce was transacted in the black market—the result, in large measure, of insufficient incentives in the officially designated "Burmese way to socialism." No official figures were available for the illegal Burmese-Thai trade, of course, but some estimates placed the value of this unprecedented smuggling at 200–300 times the legal international commerce.¹⁹ And there were those who estimated the value to be even higher.

Ironically, Ne Win's "Burmese way to socialism" stimulated his countrymen to the most free-wheeling capitalist enterprise that the nation has ever known. Black markets do not usually enjoy good reputations, but Burma's contemporary version deserves recognition; it has literally saved the country from economic collapse and has rescued the Burmese people from even more depressed living conditions. In Burma an incompetently conceived and implemented soldier-run socialist system has worked so feebly that it has provoked an antithetical free enterprise system that is more illegal than evil. A primitive or rudimentary capitalist economy has come to Burma. The change in the economy of Burma was almost the opposite of what was intended; economically and politically, the Burmese way of change may be indirect and far from democratic.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

It was in this climate of change that as early as 1974 President Ne Win informally took the initiative to ask the World Bank to establish an aid consortium to assist Burma.²⁰ The Burmese leader pressed the issue with greater vigor in 1975, and in July, 1976, shortly after the announcement of the junior officers' plot, a bank study mission paid a return visit to Rangoon. World Bank officials, Japan and Australia favored the establishment of the consortium. But other countries, including the United States, had serious reservations as to whether Ne Win understood his country's economic difficulties and whether he was prepared to take meaningful action to improve the situation.²¹

(Continued on page 224)

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In Vietnam, "Economic specialists are already drawing up plans to move several million people from high-density regions to areas where they can clear land for agriculture, exploit the country's abundant forest resources, and grow other export crops. The 'new economic zones' now being formed are only the beginning of a vast redistribution of Vietnam's population."

Vietnam's Long Road to Socialism

BY GARETH PORTER

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EVEN WHILE THEY struggled with the aftermath of the American war, Vietnam's leaders decided in September, 1975, to move quickly to reunify the governments of North and South Vietnam and to open the phase of "socialist revolution" in South Vietnam. These decisions, which led to the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in June, 1976, formally recognized that Vietnam is one country and that the aim of the Vietnamese revolution is a socialist society. But they did not deny that the two zones were still very far apart in their economic, social and political characteristics. The concrete policies of the revolutionary government in the South since reunification have continued to reflect a realistic view of socialism as a long-term goal for a society still in the process of regaining its balance after a long, debilitating and deforming war.

The move to speed formal reunification was treated by some foreign observers as confirmation of the "domination" or "annexation" of the non-socialist South by the Communist North. But this popular interpretation of Vietnamese politics is based on an historical view of the Vietnamese revolution and the outcome of the war. Since the contemporary struggle for Vietnam's independence began more than 30 years ago, the Communist-led revolution in Vietnam has been the strongest political force in all three regions of the country—North, Central and South. The Central Committee of the Lao Dong (Workers) party, which has determined the strategy and tactics of the revolution, has always been a national body, comprising leaders from all three regions.

The North was the base area of the revolution during the war and the South was the region of contention with anti-Communist, foreign-sponsored regimes, but that was because of the intervention of foreign military power, and not because of the strength of indigenous foes of the revolution. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, the Vietnamese leaders had to choose between consolidating and developing a zone in the northern half of the country or resuming an armed struggle in order to liberate the entire country. Faced with the threat of United States military intervention, they chose to consolidate the North. Tens of thousands of party cadres and former resistance fighters were subsequently imprisoned and murdered by the Diem government;¹ the leadership of the revolution throughout the South was literally decimated. It was not until 1960 that the revolutionaries responded with force; but between 1960 and 1964, the National Liberation Front (NLF) and its military arm, the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), became a formidable political-military force once more, based entirely on southerners.

The key role of northerners in the revolutionary administration and armed forces at the end of the war cannot be understood without recalling the consequences of the massive United States military intervention in Vietnam during eight years of war. American bombing and shelling drove an estimated 3.5 million people from a countryside that had once supported the NLF into cities and refugee camps in the United States-Saigon zones. Hundreds of thousands of southerners in the PLAF were killed by American firepower—several times the number who died on the Saigon side, by most estimates.² Between 1969 and 1972, as the Saigon army took control of ever larger areas of the countryside behind the shield of United States ground forces and airpower, the PLAF was no longer able to make up for its losses by recruiting

¹ For an analysis of the long-term implications of the Geneva Settlement of 1954, see Gareth Porter, *A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 4-17.

² See "Indochina War Statistics—Dollars and Deaths," *Congressional Record*, May 14, 1975, p. S8155.

more southern troops. During the 1972 offensive, a majority of the Communist soldiers were northerners.

A large proportion of party members and other civilians also fell victim to the bombing-sweep operations and the United States-sponsored Phoenix program, which aimed at destroying the infrastructure of the revolution in the South.³ Party members were forced to live in secret underground tunnels for months or even years. The party secretary of the Cu Chi district, northwest of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), a long-time revolutionary stronghold, later recalled that in some chapters in the district, every party member was killed.⁴ And a large proportion of urban cadres were killed in the Tet offensive.

As a result of this heavy toll in the countryside and in urban areas, when the revolutionary forces took control of Saigon they had to organize new local government units in wards where the party organization was weak or even nonexistent. So the *bo doi* (soldiers) from the North who had marched into Saigon on April 30 were pressed into service as political cadres.⁵ They remained in Saigon to do paramedical work, open classes for adults and primary students, and establish centers for the rehabilitation of prostitutes and drug addicts—all as an “arm of the Party.”⁶

Troops have not been the only northern contribution to the South. After the Paris Agreement brought a respite from American bombing in the South, the North sent administrators, doctors and nurses and other technical personnel to help restore normal life in the war-shattered Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) zone. When the war ended in April, 1975, more cadres of all kinds arrived to help run the urban areas and to help restore production in industry and agriculture. North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi reported in January, 1976, that “tens of thousands of cadres and workers

³ According to official figures of the former Saigon government, some 40,000 civilians were killed and nearly 20,000 were imprisoned after being “convicted” between August, 1968, and mid-1971. *Vietnam: Peace and Prosperity 1967-1971* (Saigon: Ministry of Information, 1971).

⁴ Nguyen Van Luan, “Party Activities: Party Development in Cu Chi District,” *Hoc Tap*, June, 1976.

⁵ *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, August 7, 1975.

⁶ *Nhan Dan*, December 22, 1975.

⁷ Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Council of Ministers’ report to the DRV National Assembly. Hanoi Radio, December 26, 1975.

⁸ *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, August 6, 1976.

⁹ Agence France-Presse dispatch from Hanoi, May 23, 1975.

¹⁰ Agence France-Presse dispatch from Hanoi, *Washington Post*, May 11, 1975. Unfortunately, the Western press ignored the massive material aid to the South by North Vietnam, and some articles reported on the shipment of manufactured goods to the North, suggesting that the North was exploiting the South economically. See, for example, “Saigon Shipping U.S. Goods North,” *The New York Times*, October 8, 1975.

of various branches at various levels in the North have been dispatched to work in the provinces of South Vietnam. . . .”⁷

In addition to trained personnel, the North sent raw materials, coal, spare parts, machines, tools and power-generating machines.⁸ Other assistance to the South included consumer goods, large quantities of rice to relieve hunger in the cities, thousands of water buffalo and other commodities to help restore agriculture and fishing in the South.⁹ A total of about one million tons of goods were received by the South, according to Nghi’s report. Although the North had been seriously hurt economically by the American bombing, northerners were asked to sacrifice further, because as officials said, “Our brothers in the South have suffered more than we from the war.”¹⁰

THE REUNIFICATION DECISION

The decision on the timing of reunification at the state level was not an easy one for the party leadership. The need for a common economic plan argued strongly for a single government, while there were advantages diplomatically for a separate South Vietnamese government that could succeed automatically to the former regime’s membership in international financial institutions. The key considerations were political. Party leaders viewed formal reunification as inseparable from a shift in the “revolutionary task” of the South, from winning independence and overthrowing the old structure of agrarian relations to building a socialist society. The main question, therefore, was whether the South should undertake the socialist phase of its development immediately or take another period of time to complete the pre-socialist aspects of the revolution.

From November 15 to 21, 1975, delegations representing the two zones met in Saigon for a political consultative conference on reunification and heard party Political Bureau member Truong Chinh present publicly for the first time the rationale for early reunification. Truong Chinh said the South “should immediately turn to the socialist revolution,” and emphasized that the differences between the two zones were “conditional and temporary,” while the similarities were “basic and decisive.” The insistence on driving home this point, in spite of the party’s recognition that socialism could not be established in the South until much later, indicates that the main concern in making the reunification decision was to discourage any thought in the South of the possibility of a nonsocialist path of development there.

The final declaration of the conference announced that in the first half of 1976 a nationwide election would be held for a new National Assembly—the first all-Vietnam election since the election of January 6, 1946, held under the auspices of Ho Chi Minh’s newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam. A

national election council would be formed, with an equal number of delegates from each zone, to supervise the elections. On April 24, 1976, nearly 99 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls to select 492 deputies from among 605 candidates, all of whom had been chosen by mass associations for their record in the revolutionary struggle. Reflecting this concern for a clear commitment to the goals of the revolution, no fewer than 141 of the deputies elected were members of political cadres—a category that had not even been used in analyzing the assemblies previously elected in the North.

The new Assembly convened on June 24, and immediately declared Vietnam to be formally reunified, naming the reunified government the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with Hanoi as the capital. Several southern revolutionaries were given prominent positions in the new government, including Pham Hung, a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the party branch in the South, Huynh Tan Phat, formerly the president of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), and Nguyen Huu Tho, formerly president of the NLF.

In spite of the opening of the socialist phase of the revolution in the South, Vietnamese leaders recognize that the vestiges of war and United States intervention constitute serious obstacles to any restructuring of the economy and the establishment of socialism. Some obstacles are political and ideological: the need to reintegrate into society former Saigon personnel who represent a potential threat to the regime unless they can be persuaded of the error of their ways and the widespread anti-socialist sentiment that still exists in the South.¹¹ Other obstacles are economic and physical: the high level of unemployment and the instability of prices, a shortage of draught animals, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, and an estimated 300,000 tons of unexploded bombs and shells in Vietnamese soil.

The primary problem, in the eyes of Vietnamese

leaders, is unemployment, now estimated at an astonishing 3.5 million people. Hanoi officials are concerned that opponents can exploit the situation to incite the population against the government.¹² With only two-thirds of the industrial units in the South operating by mid-1976 and more due to close because of a lack of raw materials, the reversal of the wartime urbanization of South Vietnam is even more urgent than it was at the end of the war.¹³ "New Economic Zones," which form a large semicircle north of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), offer a hectare of land for farming, a small house and farm tools free to pioneering families. But they lack the amenities to which urban people are accustomed, and too few city dwellers want to be pioneers. Despite the steady draining of the economic surplus built up in the cities over the years, the flow of departing urbanites slowed after the first 500,000 left Saigon. By the spring of 1976, authorities were beginning to cut the monthly rice ration to the unemployed in order to provide more inducement to go to the countryside.¹⁴

Southern authorities have also been concerned about their inability to maintain price stability on some basic commodities. Their political sensitivity to prices helps to explain the official campaign against wealthy businessmen who made fortunes from war profiteering and from their links with the United States and Premier Nguyen Van Thieu and who have engaged in hoarding and speculation since the end of the war. These businessmen, referred to as the "comprador bourgeoisie," exacerbated economic difficulties by manipulating their control over the market in commodities like sugar, cooking oil, condensed milk and monosodium glutamate. In August and September, 1975, for example, the price of monosodium glutamate tripled in only a few weeks.¹⁵

At that point, the PRG launched an attack throughout the South on the "comprador bourgeoisie," accusing them of sabotaging the economy and arresting hundreds of businessmen. Among those arrested were nine "inner ring families," who had dominated the distribution of rice, textiles, coffee, tobacco and other commodities for years.¹⁶ Their warehouses were confiscated by the government and some months later, a special "people's tribunal" was established to try their cases. Some of those arrested confessed that they had spread false rumors aimed at discrediting the new government, including the story that prices were soaring because cadres were taking the foods with them to the North.¹⁷

The determination of the government to gain control over prices was further underlined by the announcement on September 22, 1975, that everyone had to exchange the old Saigon government currency for new currency, and that prices of basic commodities would be fixed by the state. The currency reform was aimed at depriving the speculators of cash they

¹¹ This sentiment is openly acknowledged by the party. In the April, 1976, issue of *Hoc Tap*, it was noted that in towns and cities of the South, "capitalism has struck relatively deep roots." Cited in Nayan Chanda, "Wrestling with Socialism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 11, 1976.

¹² Nayan Chanda, Reuters dispatch, *Chicago Tribune*, September 15, 1976.

¹³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 11, 1976.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ For an analysis of the campaign against the compradore bourgeoisie and other aspects of economic policies in the South, see Huynh Kim Khanh, "Restructuring the Economy of South Vietnam," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1976 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 477-482.

¹⁶ Wilfred Burchett, "Saigon Slams Profiteers," *Guardian* (New York), September 24, 1976.

¹⁷ Nguyen Hoang, "South Viet Nam: The Struggle Against Compradore Capitalists," *Vietnam Courier*, no. 42, November, 1975, p. 7.

had used to monopolize the market in certain goods, as well as depriving suspected counterrevolutionary elements of money with which to finance their activities.¹⁸ But these moves failed to stop the hoarding and speculation, which was reported the following spring to be occurring "in a rather widespread and serious manner."¹⁹ Saigon's official newspaper admitted, in effect, that the government did not have the administrative capability to regulate prices, saying, "Basically, the South Vietnamese market is still a free one, and the struggle will remain difficult and complex."²⁰

Establishing a new administration in the unfamiliar environment of the cities and other areas controlled by the Saigon regime for decades was a task for which the revolutionaries were not adequately prepared when the war ended. As a result of the weakness of party organization and mass organizations in some Saigon districts, many opportunists found their way into subward and ward-level people's committees, claiming to be more "revolutionary" than anyone else. Within a matter of weeks, these committees had to be reorganized in response to popular complaints about their new leaders, and these people were replaced.

The biggest political challenge for the revolutionary government since the end of the war has been to reintegrate some 1.6 million officials of the former Saigon regime into the new society without either massive repression or unnecessary risk to security.²¹ Most ordinary soldiers and civil servants posed few problems; each of them was given a three-day local course and was then released. But the military officer corps, the personnel of paramilitary, police, intelligence, security and psychological warfare agencies, and higher-ranking civilian officials required more careful attention. They were sent for an indeterminate period to "reform study" courses far from home, run by the regional commands of the Vietnam

¹⁸ Le Nhu Bach, "An Important Victory on the Monetary Front in South Vietnam," *Hoc Tap*, November, 1975.

¹⁹ Le Nhu Bach, "Taxes, An Effective Tool of the Revolutionary Government in the Construction of the New Society," *Hoc Tap*, April, 1976.

²⁰ *Saigon Giai Phong*, January 6, 1976.

²¹ This figure includes 1.1 million men in the armed forces, 125,000 police and 350,000 civil servants.

²² For eyewitness reports on conditions in the camps, see Nayan Chanda, "Open Day for a New Class of Generals," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 14, 1976, p. 20. Rules regarding correspondence between "learners" and their families were published in *Saigon Giai Phong*, Aug. 6, 1975.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Some of the reports of these releases were carried by *Saigon Giai Phong*, November 16 and 20 and December 28, 1975, and Hanoi Radio, February 1, 1976.

²⁵ Alan Dawson, in a UPI dispatch from Bangkok, June 10, 1976, refers to "earlier broadcasts" which mentioned the 40,000 figure.

²⁶ May 25, 1976, PRG policy statement No. 02/CS-76, broadcast on Saigon Domestic Service, June 9, 1976.

People's Army. The "learners," as the former Saigon officials were called, attended political courses on Vietnamese history and the nature of American imperialism, did manual labor and learned new skills which they could use when they returned to productive life. While conditions in the camps were primitive, the "learners" were not physically mistreated, and they were permitted one letter to their families each month.²²

According to Nguyen Van Hieu, Vice-Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City administration, the regional army commands had been given responsibility for the reeducation of "more than 200,000 civilian and military officials in camps all over the country."²³ By the end of 1975, however, this number was being substantially reduced by the return of thousands of military and civilian officials to their families after the completion of a few months of reeducation.²⁴ Those permitted to return home were the ones who had shown "clear progress" in their reform study. The number remaining in camps at any particular time was unclear, although one broadcast monitored in Bangkok in mid-1976 referred to the figure of 40,000 still in reeducation.²⁵

On June 10, the PRG issued a policy statement on those undergoing reeducation which revealed for the first time that those still in the camps would have to remain there for as long as three years from the time they entered. It added, however, that those who "wholeheartedly make efforts in their reeducation, achieve real progress, confess their crimes and score merits may be considered for a return to their families sooner than required and for the restoration of their citizenship." But those who had committed "many crimes" and were unrepentant, as well as key figures in the various military and civilian agencies who failed to make "significant progress," were to be brought to trial at the end of the period.²⁶ Vietnamese officials argue that it would take a long time for many veterans of the old regime to begin to accept a new perspective on the revolution and on their own past behavior. But it may also be true that the authorities are concerned about releasing tens of thousands of strongly anti-Communist figures into the society when the new government has not yet been consolidated.

(Continued on page 226)

Gareth Porter is the author of *A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976) and *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). He has visited North Vietnam twice, first in December, 1974, and then in December, 1975 (as staff consultant to the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia).

"The Khmer revolutionaries have actively contributed to the postwar regional integration of Southeast Asia while consolidating Cambodia's position as a nonaligned state."

Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia

BY LAURA SUMMERS

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ONE OF THE FEW Europeans to visit Cambodia since revolutionaries gained power there in 1975 observed that "the Khmer revolution is much more radical than the Chinese or Russian revolutions." In expressing this view, Kaj Bjork, Sweden's Ambassador to China with accreditation to Phnom Penh, echoed the prevailing consensus in international diplomatic circles. He noted that the Cambodians do not "speak of socialism or communism but of new collectivist ideas," that the leaders of the new regime are "extremely nationalistic, neither Moscow nor Peking oriented" and that Prince Sihanouk appears to have adapted well to "the new conditions and to be cooperating loyally with the new revolutionary leaders. . . ."¹

The ambassador's comments corrected many erroneous assumptions and myths about current Khmer politics. Journalistic speculation about Marxist factions within the revolutionary movement and their anti-national ideological loyalties to Peking, Moscow or Hanoi rapidly gave way to efforts to comprehend these new, radical nationalist, collectivist policies.² Speculation about Sihanouk's allegiance to the revolution and its leadership also receded once the Prince returned to Phnom Penh in January, 1976, to endorse a new constitution drawn up by the revolutionary government and after he was observed by Bjork and others to be attending to a range of public duties normally reserved to Heads of State. The Prince subsequently resigned from this office and from active political life when it was clear that a newly elected Assembly of People's Representatives would designate

former Vice Premier and Defense Minister Khieu Samphan to succeed him. Since his retirement, Sihanouk continues to live in Cambodia where, according to another visiting emissary, he enjoys the respect and affection befitting his status as an eminent nationalist.³ Moreover, the Khmer delegation to the August, 1976, Conference of Nonaligned Nations claimed that the Prince was still consulted on some foreign policy matters.⁴

Local observation and reporting of the wide ranging economic and political changes occurring inside Democratic Kampuchea, as the state is now officially called, have been rare. Available information comes mostly from Khmer or foreign diplomats on formal missions or from exiles and refugees. This need not have been the case. At the time of Kaj Bjork's fact-finding mission, there were indications that other foreign observers and selected journalists would soon be invited on similar two-week tours of inspection.⁵ From the revolutionaries' point of view, it was an appropriate time to have visitors; the end of the year's rice harvest had been good, industrial reconstruction was well under way and "pacification" of frontier regions appeared complete. The Bjork mission, apparently the first of these projected visits, included Peking-based diplomats from Zambia, Egypt, Tunisia and Afghanistan, among others, and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The mission, however, was rudely interrupted by a mysterious attack on the northwestern town of Siem Reap on February 25. The Cambodian government accused the United States of conducting two separate bombing raids on the town, killing 15 people and wounding 40 others. Some 300 buildings, including houses and the local hospital, were badly damaged or destroyed. United States officials immediately insisted that no American planes were involved in the incident. The Thai government, anxious to preserve peaceful relations with a highly mobilized, revolutionary neighbor and concerned to erase parallels with last year's Mayagüez affair, was equally quick to deny

¹ *Le Monde*, March 9, 1976; Stockholm radio service, March 6, 1976.

² One such effort is Leonard Silk, "Varied Communist Goals in Asia," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1976.

³ *Le Monde*, May 29, 1976, attributes this comment to a special envoy from Mali.

⁴ *Le Monde*, September 5-6, 1976, in the course of noting hearsay in Bangkok to the effect that the Prince is not allowed to maintain foreign contacts.

⁵ *Le Monde*, March 4, 1976.

that Thai airbases had been used for the attack.⁶

Meanwhile, the visiting diplomats witnessed two large anti-American demonstrations staged by Khmer soldiers, farmers and workers. Vice-Premier Ieng Sary then took them to the scene of the attack so they could inspect the damage for themselves. While most third world diplomats joined the Phnom Penh government in insisting that the attack was an air raid and that only the Americans could have arranged it, because of his inexperience of war Kaj Bjork could not confirm that the crater he saw was made by aerial bombardment. He could describe what he saw only by reference to World War II. Cambodians, in contrast, are only too familiar with and alarmed by war. Their fears of direct foreign intervention are based on such recent destructive experiences as the joint United States-South Vietnamese invasion of 1970, saturation bombings by the United States in 1973 and the Mayagüez confrontation of 1975. Whatever the explanation for the timely or untimely attack, Phnom Penh was obliged to abandon any plans for relaxing restrictions on foreign visitors. Exile and refugee reports accordingly received much more attention than they might have and, as it turned out, than they deserved. This, in turn, served to harden Phnom Penh's attitude towards Western journalism even as the government welcomed a few Asian journalists into the country.

As a result of these developments, information about day-to-day events in Democratic Kampuchea is unavailable. Nevertheless, several major events during the year including the promulgation of a new constitution and the holding of a general election reveal that the revolutionaries are attempting to institutionalize their power and to put the country on a more peaceful footing. They have also stabilized and strengthened Cambodia's international posture as a nonaligned state by normalizing diplomatic relations with several non-Communist states.

THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION

On January 5, Cambodia's Information Minister announced the promulgation of a new constitution that sought to translate the "wishes of the people,

⁶ *The New York Times*, February 28, 1976; *Le Monde*, March 2, 1976.

⁷ The Special National Congress was convened by Khieu Samphan, a major intellectual figure in the revolution and at that time the highest ranking minister in the country. He was also Commander-in-Chief of the liberation armed forces. The congress had 311 delegates representing various mass organizations (125), sections of the liberation armed forces (112), Buddhist Monks (20), constituent organizations of the National United Front of Kampuchea (41) and the government (13 ministers). See the press communiqué from the congress in the government's *Bulletin d'information* (Paris), May 9, 1975.

⁸ *Constitution du Kampuchea Democratique* (Paris: Mission du Kampuchea Democratique, January, 1976), p. 7 *passim*.

workers, farmers and the Cambodian revolutionary army . . . [for] a national society characterized by happiness, equality, justice and genuine democracy" into reality. According to the minister, the effort to prepare a constitution reflecting the goals of the revolution began during the Special National Congress of April, 1975, that is, shortly after the liberation and evacuation of Phnom Penh.⁷

During the congress, a constitutional committee was empowered to consult with member organizations of the National United Front "at all levels" and with the royal government, the Cabinet announced by Prince Sihanouk from Peking in 1970, which was reshuffled several times during the war. This committee, the minister reported, produced four consecutive drafts, resubmitting each revised version to all groups involved until a Third National Congress meeting in December agreed to submit the fourth document to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, convened by Prince Sihanouk at the beginning of the year, unanimously approved the document. As described, the procedure employed by the revolutionaries roughly combines Leninist ideas about democratic centralism with traditional peasant beliefs about consultation and consensus in community decision-making. Sihanouk himself devised national congresses of the people and used them for consultative purposes during most of the post-colonial period. In theory, institutional arrangements specified by the constitutional document would have legitimacy.

The preamble and first articles declare that the Khmer national state is the state of the Khmer workers, peasants and other laborers who carried the heaviest burden during the liberation war and who make up 95 percent of the nation's population. All major means of production, including land, factories and machinery, are declared the collective property of "the people's state and the people's community." The "collective principle," as the constitution names it, is to be used in work relations and in government and administration. Thus, every worker has the right and the duty to participate in the running of his factory, and every peasant has the same privileges and obligations in farming the community's land. Wherever the collective principle is irrelevant, an egalitarian one is often prominent. Men and women are declared equal in every field; polygamy and polyandry are equally outlawed; and every citizen has "the right to have spiritual beliefs and religions or equally, the right not to have beliefs or religion."⁸

As for political institutions, the constitution establishes organs for law making (an Assembly of People's Representatives), for law executing (a Cabinet named by and responsible to the Assembly) and for law enforcement (people's tribunals and appeals courts set up by the Assembly). Finally, there is provision for a three-person State Presidium composed of a

President and First and Second Vice Presidents, which represents the state in domestic and foreign affairs, thus subsuming the formal duties of the Head of State. It also serves a supreme court function, because the Presidium is responsible for interpreting the constitution as well as the political "lines" defined by the Assembly.⁹

The promulgation of the constitution was an occasion for public gatherings and commemoration all over the country. The constitution was discussed and, in a sense, sanctified; the solemnity and ritual pattern of these meetings were clearly designed to use the constitutional text as the vital link between the individual and the new revolutionary *cum* cosmic order. In so doing and without specifically raising discussion of the issue, the revolutionaries were replacing monarchy with covenant as the guide to temporal order. Their intent was not lost to Prince Sihanouk. The Prince accordingly announced his retirement from public life on April 2.

Efforts began immediately to honor the Prince as a great patriot and nationalist. The Cabinet voted to give him a pension of \$8,000 a year and to dedicate a monument to him. These gestures simultaneously served to remind the public of his mortal needs and life's work, while diminishing any remnants of traditional power still attached to his royal person. This, too, was essential to protect or establish the superior value of the new constitution, because in the past, royal power was perceived

as superhuman power, to some extent magical, and [mon-

archs] pretended to be invested by the cosmic order or law for the earthly duties, for shaping the political order of the Kingdom. The goal was to assure universal harmony between microcosm and macrocosm; the means was monarchical power.¹⁰

In times of great social instability and monarchical succession, the same writer argues that an "almost doctrinal conception of power" allowed certain *procedures* to acquire the status of customary law. Subsequently and gradually, the Khmer monarchy became an elective institution, and because succession was not automatic or predetermined, monarchical power was depersonalized. By modern times, the principle of cosmic unity, harmony between society and the universe, was more highly valued than the sovereign person, the King being only one of many specified components of natural unity.¹¹ To this analysis of Khmer political theory it should be added that many monarchal persons compromised the royal institution by collaborating with colonial power from the nineteenth century on. The aristocratic, administrative and peasant revolts that followed greatly divided Khmer society.

The logic of this argument implies that the key to eliminating the monarchy lies in a modified concept of social unity, a design for a conflict-free social order that omits a specified royal component. In announcing an order where "happiness, equality, justice and true democracy reign without rich or poor people, without exploiting or exploited classes and where people live in harmony and the greatest national unity . . .," the preamble of the revolutionary constitution taps profound moral roots in Khmer political tradition even as it breaks with part of that tradition. This lends the revolution almost sacred force, a sense of historical inevitability and momentum that is translated into the desire to promote essential radical social and political changes before the historical moment is lost to others. Like the puritan revolution in England, the Khmer revolution is the expression of deep cultural and social malaise unleashed by a sudden and violent foreign assault on the nation's social structure.¹²

THE USE OF POWER

If the constitution clarifies some of the goals of the revolution, it reveals very little about the current use of revolutionary power. Government officials speak of the efforts of solidarity groups (family-based work teams) and the army in agriculture and industry, without discussing their organization or conditions of work in detail. By all accounts, however, universal conscription for work prevented a postwar famine. In addition, all industrial installations are now in operation and work is being extended on an ambitious national irrigation scheme that will reduce the country's dependence on natural forces in agriculture. In

⁹ *Ibid.* The Assembly is a "law-making" rather than a "legislative" body, according to a detailed explanation made by Khieu Samphan. In other words, it will establish general guides for policies which the Cabinet will then develop. The constitution specifies that the Assembly will contain 150 peasant representatives, 50 worker representatives and 50 army representatives, all elected every five years. In general elections in March, former "intellectuals" stood for election as workers' representatives. "Office workers" are also workers or laborers, but they are expected to contribute to the community's real labor by cultivating gardens whenever they are not working in offices.

¹⁰ Thiom Thiounn, *Le pouvoir monarchique au cambodge* (Thesis, University of Paris, 1952), p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 153. Members of the Thiom family were prominent supporters of the liberation movement.

¹² A similar fervor animated many urban youth in the period after the 1970 coup deposing Sihanouk. Their sense of opportunity faded even as they rushed to join the army because leaders of the "republican" revolution remained loyal to monarchical tradition (Lon Nol, Sirik Matak) or proved unable to relate parts of monarchical tradition to modern republican practice (Son Ngoc Thanh). Not that an exclusively urban base would have been sufficient for a political revolution in any event. One Phnom Penh youth whom I had known before and after service in the republican army said his experience on the front line was horrifying. Having apparently forgotten his earlier radicalism, he exclaimed that the revolutionary army was composed of "violent children," that the whole of peasant youth had been transformed. Lon Nol could not win the war, he said, because there "are too many peasants in Cambodia."

the near future, the government hopes to exchange surplus rice, fish and rubber for capital goods; its first commercial delegation went abroad in September.¹³ Work thus far has been accomplished by a widely dispersed administrative structure under central direction with transport of supplies and mobile work teams provided by the army.¹⁴

Phnom Penh's new Premier, Pol Pot, in a candid interview with Vietnamese journalists in late July, made only modest claims of success in reconstruction and emphasized the country's continuing problems. He described the rice harvest of 1975-76 as "a basically good crop" but "not a bumper one." In industry, he reported that only existing plants have been brought into operation; no new industries have been built. In the area of social welfare, the Premier revealed that "over 80 percent" of the labor force suffered from malaria and that medical knowledge and drug supplies were inadequate.¹⁵ Finally, he spoke of efforts to increase literacy and technical knowledge: "Before, the old regime built many advanced schools and universities, but a great number of people in the countryside were illiterate." The Premier thought work on literacy "between work periods" and on-the-job technical training were the proper responses to the country's real needs.¹⁶

EXILES AND REFUGEES

Exile and refugee reports begrudgingly confirm most of what the Premier reports. The rice crop was good, they say, but of poor quality; industries are operating but at low efficiency, because of on-the-job training of peasant-soldiers. Most of their observations and criticisms center on the general well-being of the population, however, and in addition to under-nourishment, disease and inadequate medical facil-

¹³ The condition of the labor force after the war and some of the natural and technical obstacles involved in this effort are discussed by Gareth Porter and George Hildebrand, *The Politics of Food* (Monthly Review, forthcoming).

¹⁴ Decentralized administration with collective leadership at regional, sector, commune and village levels seems fairly permanent.

¹⁵ Malaria is endemic to vast areas of Cambodia and a major factor of mortality. See Jacques Migozzi, *Cambodge: faits et problèmes de population* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973), pp. 108-15.

¹⁶ Literacy efforts and the simplification of Khmer language eliminating unequal status designations are mentioned by Jerome and Jocelyne Steinbach, *Phnom penh libérée* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), pp. 20-21 and by *Le Monde*, February 15, 1976.

¹⁷ *Le Monde*, February 18, 1976.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, March 9, 1976.

¹⁹ *Le Monde*, November 29, 1975; April 23, 1976; July 18-19, 1976.

²⁰ "Déclaration de la Mission du Gouvernement du Kampuchea Démocratique en France," Paris, June 13, 1976.

²¹ *Le Monde*, May 2-3, 1976. Mitterrand, while no doubt well briefed on Cambodia, takes advantage of any occasion to remind the French public of the non-revolutionary orientation of French socialism.

ties, they accuse the revolutionaries of brutality in their rapid drive to attain self-sufficiency and of using fear as a tool for controlling the society.

There is little doubt of the fear and suffering of the now dispersed urban population, which is unaccustomed to manual labor. It also appears that some work groups, in lieu of other forms of reeducation, are obliged to work harder and longer than others.¹⁷ When questioned about reports of starvation and the fate of former city dwellers, Ambassador Kaj Bjork said he saw no signs of starvation, and noted that although "they make people work in the fields, in the sun, with a hoe and a spade . . . you do not get the impression that they are working very hard all the time."¹⁸ What the urban refugee considers "hard" labor may not be punishment or community service beyond human endurance. But his protest has been effective in Western liberal societies because of the memories it invokes of Russian history. Such associations take what is happening in Cambodia out of its historical and cultural context.

Such confusion has, nevertheless, been cultivated by those exiles who continue to wage the war they have lost and who seek to regain foreign support, primarily from France or the United States. The establishment of a self-proclaimed "exile government" led by Colonel Souvatthana and including former ministers of the Lon Nol government was announced in Paris on November 17, 1975. Periodically, this group holds news conferences to bring the statements of refugees and "Khmer Rouge defectors" to the attention of the Western press. At the same time, it publicizes the progress of armed "resistance" groups inside Cambodia.¹⁹ These public pleas for support and the public concern raised by sensational, but false, documents finally provoked the Paris Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to protest that some journalists were degrading their profession and that the French held a major share of the responsibility for allowing these activities to continue.²⁰

The dispute over the truth of exile allegations of "massacres" and brutality came to a head between April and June, 1976, when prominent European magazines printed a series of photographs showing alleged atrocities in Cambodia. The photos, showing men being beaten to death with hoes and axes or pulling ploughs under armed guard, were later exposed as fakes set up by Thai journalists seeking to influence the outcome of elections in Thailand. Emotions aroused in France resulted in more refugee interviews and, finally, in a television program on the efforts of the anti-revolutionary resistance operating near the Thai frontier. Even the Socialist party leader, François Mitterrand, who acknowledged that some documents about the situation were false, felt obliged to criticize the Khmer revolutionaries for forcing social change too rapidly.²¹ The United

States press, not to be outdone, produced dramatic news reports and editorials based on refugee and unnamed intelligence sources.²² In retrospect, these reports are partly inaccurate and are still largely unverified. The flap illustrates the powerful and potentially dangerous force that is generated when the political machinations of a few capture the attention of a concerned and uninformed public.

Many exiles who are not openly waging war against the revolution nonetheless contribute to international perceptions in subtle ways. They lament the passing of elite privilege and the urban intellectual meritocracy that characterized the Sihanouk regime. Their position in that order was, however, attained at the cost of neglecting general social and economic development. Consequently, there was a great social and political distance between city and village communities. In 1957, for example, a European traveler visited a Cambodian village with a prominent Khmer novelist as his guide. The writer confessed that he had "forgotten" what a village was really like although he wrote about the villages in his novels. He stroked a child's head in violation of traditional custom.²³ This distance between city and village resulted in some stereotyping. In 1968, another visitor was chauffeured past country tribesmen. "Hill people," said the capital city guide to the visitor. "Phnong" (savages), said his son, "Stop and let me look at them."²⁴ In normal, non-revolutionary times, superior or scornful attitudes are softened by paternalism or a sense of noblesse oblige.

Since the revolution, the displaced Khmer elite frequently defend the European educational system and the dual language structure that allowed it to control Khmer society. Setting aside the gentility of non-revolutionary times, they attack the unfortunate who have rejected their leadership:

Phoet who governed Maung-Russey canton . . . is an illiterate. Everybody saw that on September 30, 1975, in Battambang when he couldn't read a speech to a meeting of a thousand workers. . . . Now, all village chiefs are selected from among the poorest and the most illiterate.

²² *Time*, April 19, 1976, asserts that 20,000 Khmers have fled to Thailand and that 500,000 to 600,000 are estimated to have died since the end of the war. The first figure more than doubles official Thai Interior Ministry statistics; only refugees and unnamed intelligence sources are cited for the second. *Time's* story was picked up by *Le Monde*, April 13, 1976, and by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 17, 1976, which reports that "observers agree" that as many as 500,000 may have died and that "perhaps" another 400,000 fled the country. Columnists like Jack Anderson took the issue to editorial pages.

²³ Christopher Pym, *Mistapim in Cambodia* (London: The Travel Book Club, 1960), pp. 24-5.

²⁴ Maslyn Williams, *The Land in Between* (London: William Collins, Ltd., 1969), p. 235.

²⁵ *Le Monde*, April 18-19, 1976.

²⁶ *The Washington Post*, February 2, 1976.

²⁷ *Le Monde*, November 8, 1976.

All documents in French or English have been burned.²⁵

For a few thousand Khmers like the writer of this passage, the proper social pecking order has been turned upside down. The chosen few have been rejected by their natural followers, who add insult to injury by insisting on self-government. As if to emphasize his own sense of inequity, the writer concludes his testimony by accusing the revolutionaries of failing to distribute food equally. This charge is challenged by another refugee, a villager, who says "the thing we liked best" about the new administration was that it divided up all pigs, chickens and ducks in his village equally.²⁶ Refugee accounts are contradictory. Clearly, they reflect the fears and expectations arising from the exile's position in the old society. Most Cambodians leaving the country in 1975 managed to do so without much difficulty as if the regime were acknowledging that they were among the few whose values could not be accommodated in a people's state.²⁷

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In foreign affairs, too, Democratic Kampuchea seeks to dissociate herself from traditional patterns of domination. Particularly friendly relations with Thailand and Laos in 1976 reflect a desire to establish links with societies having related cultural and linguistic traditions and to break out of the colonial mold of Indochina. This requires an assertion of independence from Vietnam and its revolution. Thus, relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea are proper and formal to emphasize the equality of the partners and to deny any lingering imperial assumptions of Vietnamese hegemony. Meanwhile, the Khmers were quick to send a shipment of their own scarce rice resources to Laos and have engaged in complex and continuous negotiations with Thailand that culminated in that country's reconciliation with revolutionary power in Southeast Asia.

In January, barely two months after diplomatic relations were reestablished, the frontier between Thailand and Cambodia was temporarily sealed. Informal commercial relations (black market trade), which had provided Cambodia with supplementary rice and fuel oil, also ceased. Thousands of work teams were brought into Battambang at this time, and military operations were also noted there. Amidst these troop and labor movements, Khmers making their way to the border were fired upon. They also saw the execution of soldiers wearing the uniforms of Lon Nol's

(Continued on page 228).

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In Laos, ". . . the final stage of the 'national democratic revolution' revealed a party tempered by two decades of hardship, which was capable of positioning itself and preparing popular consciousness in order to 'seize the opportunity' when it presented itself."

New Stages of Revolution in Laos

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TRUE TO ITS NAME, the Provisional Government of National Unity (PGNU) in Laos ruled temporarily, pending full national unification. The termination of 25 years of national division and conflict, however, was achieved not by means of harmonization but rather by the expulsion of rightist political and military leaders and their United States support system in May and June, 1975. A bloodless seizure of administrative power by "people's committees" then spread through the districts and towns of Laos, followed by local elections in November and the sudden establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on December 2, 1975. The previously semi-secret Communist party of Laos subsequently moved its full strength into the new government in Vientiane and announced that its goal was an independent, prosperous, socialist state.

The stage had been set for this remarkable political transformation by the Paris cease-fire agreement and the United States withdrawal from Vietnam. Within three weeks, on February 21, 1973, the Communist-led Lao Patriotic Front (NLHS)¹ and the Royal Lao government had reached a corollary agreement in Vientiane. Fourteen months later, a warily negotiated protocol to the agreement was implemented by the formation of an equally balanced coalition government (the PGNU) in Vientiane. A National Political Consultative Council (NPCC) was simultaneously appointed, to meet in the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The two capital cities were "neutralized" by the formation of joint police forces and

matching army detachments of royal and "patriotic" forces. The remainder of the country, however, remained fixed in the cease-fire pattern: the Patriotic Front exclusively controlled almost four-fifths of the territory while participating simultaneously on the "Vientiane side" in the coalition government, which controlled the remaining more populous villages and towns along the Mekong River. Most North Vietnamese troops remained in Laos in the eastern regions even after the deadline for withdrawal.

Fifteen years of American-assisted military campaigns against the Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese advisers and fighting units had produced a negative territorial balance sheet. Understandably, the anti-Communist leaders resented the unsymmetrical bargain negotiated by the neutralist Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma. They resented the requirement of unanimous agreement before any action by the provisional government, the access of Communist ministers to authority and information in Vientiane without reciprocal privileges for the anti-Communists in the Communist "liberated zone," the indefinite recess imposed upon the National Assembly while the appointed Council (NPCC), under the adroit chairmanship of the "Red Prince" Souphanouvong,² issued policy pronouncements and promoted their popular acceptance. In retrospect, some Lao leaders who have now found refuge in the United States see the Vientiane agreement as their "death warrant"; and Pathet Lao historians treat it as a "great victory" that helped to shift the balance of forces in their favor. Its strict implementation became a major party slogan and remained so until the abolition of the monarchy in favor of a socialist republic, months after the agreement had lost its original force and intent.

Regardless of the specific provisions of the Vientiane agreement, some such arrangement became

¹ *Neo Lao Hak Sat* (NLHS) in the Laotian language. The term *Pathet Lao* is commonly applied to the movement represented by the Lao Patriotic Front, which is controlled by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP).

² Prince Souphanouvong, the half-brother of Souvanna Phouma, joined political forces with Ho Chi Minh against the French in 1945 and subsequently became the foremost public leader of the Lao Patriotic Front.

necessary once the Americans disengaged their forces from Vietnam. The civil war in Laos ceased to involve United States military interests, when American soldiers and pilots were no longer endangered by the North Vietnamese use of eastern Laos as a corridor to attack in South Vietnam. In 1973, as in 1961, the United States preferred an ostensibly neutralized coalition government to further engagement in civil war. Even though two previous coalitions, in 1957–1958 and 1962–1963 (growing out of international conferences at Geneva), had broken up, Souvanna Phouma was willing to try again as Prime Minister. Since the Pathet Lao would have parity in the Cabinet and without American largesse and advice the rightist element would be less likely to press an advantage, Souvanna might be able to bring about a peaceful national reconciliation. Instead, as a North Vietnamese editorial has since asserted, “the three times when coalition governments were established were the three times when [Communist] victories were consolidated for further advance.” Coalitions illustrated the “clever application of the revolutionary strategies and tactics of the Lao People’s Revolutionary party” (LPRP).³

The Communist victory during the PGNU period was shaped by revolutionary doctrine but depended heavily on external events and Lao national characteristics. The fundamental factor was the taking of Saigon and Phnom Penh by Communist forces and the removal of the United States support and presence in Vietnam and Cambodia. This created a “historic opportunity” for the leadership of the LPRP, and they were ready to mobilize “the masses throughout the country to rise up to seize power in the areas controlled by the Vientiane reactionaries in the shortest possible time.”⁴

The “political awareness” of the people had already been heightened by the NPCC’s 18 Points for “the current construction of the fatherland” and the draft law on Democratic Freedoms, two documents of political principles enunciated by the Pathet Lao-dominated NPCC in mid-1974. Now the decisive phase of the revolution was suddenly at hand. “Three strategic blows” were struck: against the reactionary administrative authority throughout the PGNU zone,

³ *Nhan Dan*, December 4, 1975, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, December 5, 1975, Asia and Pacific, K2.

⁴ 3d Resolution of the Party Central Committee, *Joint Publications Research Service*, August 16, 1976, translations in Southeast Asia, no. 657.

⁵ During the period from July, 1974, to April, 1975, strikes occurred at the Electricity Company and the German Technical College, and among the United States Embassy guard force, medical orderlies at the Operation Brotherhood hospital, school teachers in Vientiane, soldiers in Ban Houei Sai, students and civil servants in Thakhek, students in Luang Prabang and Pakse, junior police officers, and postal workers in Vientiane.

against the Royal Armed Forces, and against the United States Agency for International Development offices and programs. After a virtually bloodless take-over of these institutions during the summer of 1975, the time was ripe for nationwide local elections and the sudden convening of a National Congress of People’s Representatives on December 1–2 to ratify the “voluntary” resignation of King Savang Vatthana and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in favor of a republic fully managed by the LPRP.

To seize an opportunity this effectively and to achieve an almost bloodless revolution, the Communists required the “favorable objective situation” that events in Vietnam and Cambodia provided. But they had also used the 13 months of coalition government to prepare the ground, through “struggle movements” using a variety of methods. The NPCC was mobilized by Prince Souphanouvong, who was residing in the royal city, where he frequently conferred with his ailing half-brother, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The liberal democratic-sounding 18 Points and Democratic Freedoms issued unanimously by the NPCC became a rallying slogan for student organizations and labor groups that began, during 1974–1975, to assert themselves through strikes and demonstrations. Meanwhile, the unwillingness of the non-Communist ministers to agree on all the Points (particularly with regard to recognition for the still contending “liberation” groups in Cambodia and Vietnam) and the resistance of traditionally powerful families to the formal dissolution of the National Assembly provided fuel for Communist attacks on “feudal, reactionary, neo-colonialist American lackeys.”

The succession of strikes that rippled through the PGNU area⁵ raised genuine issues of wage-levels in a period of inflation and focused on demands that corrupt or abusive managers be fired, or that foreign supervisors (e.g., Filipino managers in the United States-financed Operation Brotherhood hospital) be replaced by Lao personnel. Frequently, local students extolling the 18 Points would step forth as advisers or with offers to mediate. Although an unseen hand was often suspected in these repeated demands and demonstrations, there was little need for plots or pay-offs to generate economic hardship, xenophobia and student restiveness.

The mutiny of Royal Army soldiers in the northern town of Ban Houei Sai in December, 1975, was more serious and instructive, since it involved the holding of United States AID personnel as virtual hostages and the joining of Pathet Lao troops in partial support. Thereafter, the Prime Minister was ready to arrest student leaders (who escalated their demands in Thakhek, in March) and on occasion even to ban demonstrations.

All these demonstrations provided a sort of train-

ing ground for the ultimate student occupation of United States AID offices and living compounds in May, 1975, which brought about the termination of the program and the reduction of the United States Mission in Laos to less than 30 persons.⁶ Some activists who later fled from "reeducation seminars" felt they had been exploited during this episode; on the other hand, the Pathet Lao may regret that student activists so completely alienated the Americans as to end all forms of United States assistance.

Another "strategic blow," struck against national government personnel and local authorities, also relied heavily on intimidation. At the Cabinet level, key rightist personalities were the targets of vicious threatening placards during the May Day parade. Within a week, five leading anti-Communists in the ministries and numerous generals had been induced to resign and take their families to safety in Thailand. In the ensuing weeks, the ministries themselves were purified through the medium of strikes and the denunciations of a few activists against "reactionary" staff members, who usually resigned and departed. "Reeducation" was made available through seminars, conducted within the bureaucracy itself or, in the former "liberated zone," for reactionary soldiers, police and other officials, whose reeducation would take much longer. In the provinces, starting in the southern cities, "people's revolutionary committees" seized power, often with the backing of nearby Pathet Lao troops, and called for the reunification of the country in the name of the Vientiane agreement. New administrative committees usually took power following these bloodless uprisings, and the PGNU endorsed the new "patriotic" authorities. Despite the radical alteration of the PGNU caused by the departure of the influential Sananikone, Abhay and Champassak families, the façade of the Vientiane agreement was maintained for another six months. Replacements were found who, like Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, fully adapted themselves to the new atmosphere.

The third "strategic blow," against the Royal Army, like the assault on administrative authority, was preceded by pressure and harassment during 1974-1975 and was climaxed by the avoidance of an outright battle. The Joint Commission on the Implementation of the [Vientiane] Agreement had managed to stake out 17 cease-fire line markers (out of the 27 specified in the agreement for the most unstable areas) by April, 1975. Numerous scuffles

⁶ United States personnel had numbered over 800 earlier in the year. *The New York Times*, May 10, 1976.

⁷ *Vientiane News*, April 1-7, 1975.

⁸ See Kaysone Phomvihan Report to Supreme People's Council, Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao, June 14, 1976, in *FBIS*, June 23, 1976.

⁹ *Vientiane, Siang Pasason* in Lao, June 1, 1976.

or engagements and some calculated encroachments had occurred, but the Pathet Lao never permitted a joint investigative team to cross into their territory, and they never responded to the 80 official protests of the Vientiane side (while lodging only 2 of their own).⁷ In late March, Pathet Lao forces attacked the strategic crossroad of Sala Pou Khoun between the two capitals, where the most aggressive Royal military area commander, General Vang Pao, had resorted to bombing to repulse his adversaries. As the engagement deepened in April, Vang Pao again resorted to his light aircraft, the Cabinet called for a reciprocal pulling back of forces, and the Prime Minister ordered Royal generals to avoid battle. By the end of April, Pathet Lao forces had moved from Sala Pou Khoun down the road toward Vientiane (80 miles away) and other fronts were restive. General Vang Pao, like the other top officers, acceded to Souvanna's suggestion that he leave the country, and thousands of his Meo tribal followers started to flee in panic through the mountains to Thailand.

With its leading generals gone, the Royal Army began a metamorphosis that ended in its "reunification" with the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA), through a combination of insurrections, invitations to merge with neighboring LPLA units, requests for LPLA advisers, and orders from the Minister of Defense forbidding resistance. These peaceful seizures of military power, coinciding with the seizure of administrative power, spread from district to district throughout the summer. But the dramatic entry of the LPLA into "liberated" Vientiane was saved for August 23, 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of the tiny nationalist uprising against the Japanese and French that opened the door to national revolution in Laos. Under the LPRP, it became a "democratic" revolution as well.

With the surprise establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in Vientiane in December, 1975, following local elections and the convening of a Congress of People's Representatives, the Lao Communists proclaimed that the "national democratic" revolution had been achieved. The next stage was to be the "gradual advance toward socialism, bypassing the development of capitalism."⁸ The Lao Communist party, renamed the Lao People's Revolutionary party in 1972, would lead this move toward socialism, as it led the national democratic revolution. During the earlier stage, the party had maintained secrecy about its leadership role because, in its words, "our people's awareness was not yet high."⁹ After 1975, the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF), led by Prince Souphanouvong, and the Lao People's Liberation Army were expanded and strengthened under the open direction of the party.

As the party emerged from the penumbra, seven of its key leaders became known as members of its

politburo. Kaysone Phomvihan, Prime Minister of the LPDR, was publicly identified as the Secretary General of the party and the most powerful figure in the Lao leadership. The four Deputy Prime Ministers—Nouhak Phoumsavan, Phoumi Vongvichit, Phoune Sipraseuth and Khamtay Siphandone—are politburo members, as are Souphanouvong and Sisomphone Lovansay, chairman and vice chairman of the new Supreme People's Assembly. This Marxist-Leninist leadership, forged in three decades of revolutionary struggle, has a remarkable record of stability and cohesion.¹⁰ During most of the final decade, it directed the revolution from a cave complex in Sam Neua Province, taking shelter from the American bombing that rained intermittently from 1964 until the cease-fire of February, 1973.

The party's new action strategy was fully laid out in the Third Resolution of the party's Central Committee, announced in May, 1976.¹¹ The resolution calls for the simultaneous implementation of three revolutions: a production relations revolution, a technical revolution, and a cultural and ideological revolution. (The identical revolutions were called for in Vietnam by Le Duan, first secretary of the Vietnam Workers' party, at the inaugural session of Vietnam's National Assembly.¹²)

Economic development is seen as most important, since changes in other sectors flow from it. The party strategy will emphasize increased production in agriculture, forestry and livestock breeding, with the development of related processing industries and improvement in transportation, communication and repair facilities. The goal is a sovereign, self-reliant economy, although (in contrast to policy in Cambodia) assistance from foreign countries and broadened economic relations are also sought. During the transformation of the economy, the influence of the comprador bourgeoisie (the instruments of the colonialists and imperialists) and the feudalists will be eliminated and their property will be confiscated by the state. The national bourgeoisie (entrepreneurs who are deemed patriotic) may undertake joint enterprises with the state, which will provide guidelines and controls. In agriculture, there will be a gradual movement toward collectivization, beginning with the formation of labor exchange units and cooperatives.

¹⁰ This record of stability and cohesion is exceeded, perhaps, only by the Vietnamese Communist leadership, from whom the Pathet Lao leaders drew valuable guidance. According to an official LPRP history (*FBIS*, Vientiane, March 24, 1976), the Indochinese Communist party, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930 with other Vietnamese revolutionaries, led the Lao Communist movement until 1955, when a separate Lao party, the Lao People's party, was established.

¹¹ See 3d Resolution of the Party Central Committee, *op. cit.*

¹² Hanoi, VNA in English, June 25, 1976, in *FBIS*, June 29, 1976.

Great emphasis is placed upon the training of cadres and workers, and the need to utilize former non-Communist technicians. Political indoctrination is clearly a critical aspect of training, especially for those who were deformed by the previous rule. The party resolution reveals that "tens of thousands of former soldiers, policemen and civil servants of the puppet administration . . . are now undergoing re-education." Raising the national educational level is also emphasized, particularly for party members and cadres, and a great effort is to be invested in expunging the "vestiges of the enslaving, reactionary and depraved culture of the old, rotten regime." Publications must be produced that describe the Lao patriotic traditions and teach Marxism-Leninism. In the "liberated" zone, the LPF is to lead the mobilization into mass organizations of workers, peasants, youth, women, ethnic groups, intellectuals, students and Buddhist monks.

The obstacles facing the party in achieving its goals are recognized as substantial. Levels of political consciousness of the various ethnic groups are uneven; the administrative competence of cadres is low; several thousand dissident "remnant" soldiers remain; hooligans, prostitutes, hippies, playboys, smugglers and bandits on the Lao-Thai border, all bequeathed by the former regime, are still vigorous. The country's economy is based on scattered, small-scale, backward agriculture; the "liberated" zone was very badly ravaged by war; the Vientiane side was dominated by neocolonialism and feudalism and some economic sectors are still in the hands of comprador bourgeoisie and feudalists. In view of the lengthy foreign dependence of Laos, the departure of the American imperialists, who had sustained an artificial economy, brought serious economic dislocation and soaring unemployment.

Foreign enemies continue to threaten the revolutionary regime. The resolution accuses the "United States imperialists and Thai reactionary power-holders of all sorts of cunning tricks to destroy the Lao revolution," including an economic blockade, provocative acts along the Thai border, the nurture of Lao reactionaries, and support for rifts between Thailand and Laos. At a lower threshold of danger,

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MacAlister Brown was Fulbright Lecturer in Public Administration in Nepal, 1968-1969, and is a frequent contributor to scholarly journals. Joseph J. Zasloff is the author of *The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973) and co-editor, with MacAlister Brown, of *Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOLDIERS AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

By J. STEPHEN HOADLEY. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. 307 pages, appendices, notes and index, \$16.25.)

J. Stephen Hoadley makes the very valid points in his preface that "the role played by military officers in modern politics is a subject of concern to citizen and scholar alike . . . and promises to remain so for decades to come. Military coups are most often found in the Third World developing nations . . . military involvement in politics is likely to be a fact of political life in the Third World for the foreseeable future. . . ." Hoadley believes that we should attempt to understand this continuing phenomenon in order to respond to it more effectively and with full awareness "of its many ramifications."

As examples, he has written about Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia. He argues that the study of the role of the military should be undertaken, not from a preconceived point of view about the right or wrong of military insurgency, but in light of the question as to whether a military or a civilian-led government is better suited to "the political and economic development of a particular underdeveloped nation."

Written before the reunification of North and South Vietnam and before the latest military takeover in Thailand, the book provides a well-detailed recent political history of five countries. In view of the October insurgency by the military in Thailand, the words of his last sentence in the chapter on Thailand foreshadowed events: "At the moment the Thai military leaders are remaining in the background. It is too early to predict whether this will be permanent . . . but if the past is any guide to the future, we will be hearing more about army officers in Thai political affairs."

Hoadley concludes that there seems to be little to choose between the two types—military and civilian-led regimes—as far as economic and political development is concerned. The notes and tables are of great value.

O.E.S.

SOUTHERN ASIA: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY AND PEACE. EDITED BY DONALD C. HELLMAN. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books Division of D.C. Heath and Company, 1976. 297 pages and index, \$16.95.)

This is the latest volume issued by the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. The au-

thors selected by Donald Hellman write about the important international questions raised in South Asia, with a "long-term perspective" aimed at establishing what the United States should and may be able to do.

Apparently, there is not much hope for any substantial improvement of economic conditions in overpopulated southern Asia. Today, the United States must therefore reassess its foreign policy and the moral foundation on which that policy rests. Despite civilian and military repression of individual freedom (both Communist and non-Communist) in southern Asia, American military intervention in that area would raise more problems than it could solve.

O.E.S.

ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR. BY ARTHUR WESTING. (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1976. 119 pages and references, Swedish kr. 76.50.)

Arthur Westing examines the ecological consequences of the anti-environmental activities of the second Indochina War; he describes the results of the defoliant sprayings, the ravages of bomb and shell craters and the use of land-clearing equipment over extended areas. Excellent color photos show the extent of the damage in many regions.

O.E.S.

THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF THE LAW? BY JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, BURKE MARSHALL AND JACK SCHWARTZ. (New York: The Free Press, 1976. 586 pages, documents, maps and related transcripts, \$10.95.)

In addition to the opinions and conclusions of the authors, this work contains the text of volume 1 of the report prepared by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who headed the United States Army's investigation of the My Lai massacre.

O.E.S.

SELF-HELP IN PACIFIC-ASIAN DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY EDWARD L. RADA AND KAN WU. (La Mirada, California: Twilight Publications for the Soochow University Press, Taipei, Taiwan, 1976. 172 pages and index, no charge.)

This short work contains the reports presented to the 1973 Conference on Self-Help in Pacific-Asian development in Taipei, Taiwan.

O.E.S.

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THAILAND

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socialists have already been sought or arrested. There are reports that two socialist members of the national legislature, Khlaew Norapati and Colonel Somkit Srisangkom, have gone underground or have fled from the country. There are also reports of arrests of university professors and administrators with "socialist" or "liberal" views. Ominously, there are reports of opposition from inside the ranks of the military leadership and of possible conflict among high-ranking army generals.

THE RURAL INSURGENCIES

A major problem inherited by the new military government is the continuation of rural insurgency in the southern, northern, and northeastern provinces. Border violence is caused by a complex combination of domestic and external factors.¹³ Rural insurgents have plagued every government in Thailand since the early 1950's, although insurgency did not assume serious proportions until after 1965.¹⁴ In spite of many promises by the new military leaders in Bangkok, rural insurgency will very likely continue.

The insurgency in the south probably poses the least serious threat, although it is certainly the most complicated. It consists of three dissident groups waging small-scale attacks against Thai government forces for different purposes. A Thai-Muslim separatist organization estimated at about 600 men has been attacking government installations and military personnel since 1968. It exploits many grievances among the Thai-Muslim minority, and its alleged goal is to cause the secession of the four southern provinces and merge them with the Federation of Malaysia. The Thai-Muslim dissidents also include some criminal groups who are engaged more in banditry than in politically inspired violence. Their disruptive capacity has declined considerably since the capture of several key leaders in the past two years.¹⁵

A more sizable threat exists in the guerrilla forces of the Malayan Communist party, which has fought against established governments in Malaysia since the Japanese occupation in World War II. In spite of great odds, this insurgent movement, consisting

mostly of Malay Chinese, has continued to use the jungle-covered terrain along the Thai-Malaysian border as a base for staging armed attacks against the Malaysian government. Since 1964, its military operations have been checked in some degree by a 500-man Malaysian security detachment stationed under a joint military agreement at the town of Betong on the Thai side of the border. In June, 1976, organized demonstrations in Betong caused Seni's government to yield to demands for the removal of the Malaysian security force.¹⁶ Some observers claim these demonstrations were inspired by the Malayan Communist party leadership. The removal of Malaysian troops has caused some serious strains between the governments in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and Malaysian military officials are predicting an increase in the attacks by the Malayan Chinese Communist insurgents.

The most recent insurgent group in this area is a small organization of Thai Communists that has attacked government outposts in the mid-southern provinces of Trang, Phattalung, Surat Thani, and Nakorn Si Thammarat. This dissident force, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, is estimated at only 400 men; yet it has displayed an amazing organizational capacity to launch successful and costly attacks against Thai army and police units in this region.¹⁷

The insurgency in the northern provinces involves armed attacks by mountain tribesmen, largely Meos, against isolated government buildings and military personnel. Dissident groups in this densely wooded area continue to be supplied with weapons and trained leaders from Communist China, in spite of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Peking and the promise of the Chinese Communist leaders to avoid interference in internal Thai affairs. In this region, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 armed insurgents have waged some extensive and devastating attacks against Thai army and police units. Instead of the hit-and-run tactics employed by insurgents elsewhere in Thailand, since 1971 guerrilla operations in the north have forced sizable territories under insurgent control. These areas have been labeled "special insurgency zones" by the Thai military authorities, and they can be entered only by large, heavily armed government forces. Communist terrorists have also attacked construction crews engaged in road-building projects and have often completely halted government efforts to provide better transportation and communication facilities in the north.

Large-scale counter-insurgency operations against the northern insurgents by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) have been disappointing and generally unsuccessful. After a recent battle between government troops and Communist guerrillas in Phetchabun province which lasted for several days,

¹³ For a description and analysis of the various insurrections in Thailand see Frank C. Darling, "Rural Insurgencies in Thailand: A Comparative Analysis," *Spectrum* (April, 1975), pp. 12-24.

¹⁴ Justus M. van der Kroef, "Guerrilla Communism and Counterinsurgency in Thailand," *Orbis* (Spring, 1974), pp. 112-16.

¹⁵ Personal interview, United States Consulate, Songkhla, Thailand, May 10, 1976.

¹⁶ *Bangkok Post*, June 8, 1976.

¹⁷ *Bangkok World*, July 8, 1976.

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THE BURMESE WAY OF CHANGE

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The World Bank's confidential analysis of Burma's economy, revealed to the Rangoon government in March, 1976, was devastating in its conclusions about Burmese economic performance under Ne Win.²² Indeed, one of the most encouraging development for Burma in recent years may well be the fact that Ne Win received a return visit of the study mission after its initial unfavorable report. The report noted that "directly productive sectors" of the economy, which grew at an annual rate of two percent a year, lagged behind the population growth of 2.2 percent. The rate of growth of agriculture was 1.7 percent between 1965 and 1975, the production of rice being largely stagnant despite population expansion. The purchasing power of exports, according to the World Bank, was "less than half of what it was 10 years ago." Terms used in the study mission's report to describe Burma's economic management included "inadequate," "inefficient," and "rigid."²³

No less significant was the fact that Ne Win seemed willing to accept assistance from the World Bank, an institution in which the United States and other major non-Communist nations play major roles.

WHITHER BURMESE NEUTRALISM?

In 1948, U Nu, the independent country's first Premier, may have favored the British-American protection of his country against external Communist attack (meaning from China). But neither London nor Washington favored such a relationship,²⁴ thus nonalignment was the only apparent alternative. Although "neutralism" began as a second-choice foreign policy, it was pursued with a passion and has probably been the most scrupulously followed nonalignment in the world.

This was nowhere more clearly indicated than in Burmese aid relations with the world's major "donor nations." Through 1973, Burma had received foreign assistance in excess of \$735 million. The People's Republic of China was the chief source of such help (\$114 million), but not all the Chinese credits were used. The Rangoon government also accepted aid from Japan (\$85 million), the United States (\$67

²² For a summary and many quotations, see Kamm, *op. cit.*
²³ For an account of Burmese "reforms," see James Hariman, "Burma's Bid to Stop the Rot," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 16, 1976.

²⁴ See the author's *U Nu of Burma*, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

²⁵ According to one source, the Peking-backed Burmese Communists, who operated west of the Salween River for the first time in 1975-1976, controlled one-third of the important Shan States. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 21, 1976, p. 15.

million), and West Germany (\$57 million). World Bank assistance totaled \$63 million, but this was not in the form of consortium aid discussed in 1975 and 1976.

The fall of Vietnam as well as Burma's economic difficulties may have precipitated a small change in Burmese foreign policy. The Ne Win government, for example, is still not interested in membership in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) despite its good relations with the five ASEAN nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines). But Ne Win was visibly moved by the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia in April, 1975.

In June, 1975, the year of South Vietnam's collapse, the Ne Win government took delivery of the first 4 of 18 American helicopters, to be used ostensibly to combat opium smuggling, although such use could not be guaranteed. Both Washington and Moscow were secretly approached during the same year with regard to major weapons procurement for use against the Chinese-aided insurgents in the northeast.²⁵ In November, 1975, Ne Win paid a periodic visit to Peking and returned more concerned than usual over China's refusal to halt "party-to-party" assistance, despite normally cordial relations on a "state-to-state" basis between the Burmese and the Chinese.

The bid for World Bank consortium assistance—like the allegation of Communist Vietnamese-supplied arms to the rebels in the northeast—must be viewed in the context of the external environment as well as in terms of worsening conditions in the country. Burma is not about to abandon her long-pursued policy of nonalignment in international relations—especially under the unbending Ne Win, even though, paradoxically, he may be the only Burmese leader who could make such a major shift on his own. But Burmese foreign policy in 1976 was still different from the foreign policy of the first years of Ne Win's rule. Without having altogether shed its rigidity, it was more practical and pragmatic. The Burmese way of change was at work in foreign policy.

WHITHER BURMA?

Nobody knows, of course, what the results of the Burmese way of change will be. Politically, Burma is a country much shrouded in secrecy. Its leader of 14 years, however, is challenged today as never before and is clearly in danger of destruction at the hands of the very soldier class on which his power has rested. Political, economic, and foreign policy changes are proceeding in an often slow and indirect manner and with results that are frequently at odds with the goals of the country's leaders. The precise character of tomorrow's Burma cannot be predicted, but the likelihood of early and significant changes seems greater than at any time since Ne Win seized authority in 1962.

THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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against the other country or other countries in the region." What this might portend in the event of subtle intervention by Chinese, Russians or Vietnamese remains to be seen. Nevertheless, this agreement indicates the new diplomatic independence of both the Philippines and Vietnam.

Recent alterations in the temper of United States relations with former close military allies like the Philippines and Thailand can serve as benchmarks for our relations with other third world societies and areas. If the Philippines and Thailand continue to improve their contacts with Indochina, the results will be beneficial to middle- and long-run American objectives, including increasing sophistication and openness in Southeast Asian economic and political life styles.¹¹ A new order is haltingly emerging in the area, and new dimensions of political behavior must be carefully measured.

American diplomats must be increasingly sensitive to the intraregional competition between Marxist forms of modernization and traditional, indigenous forms of private and family capitalism. More nations of Southeast Asia may turn to ideological marxism because of American aloofness and inattention to local attitudes than because of clever Soviet or Chinese diplomacy.

The United States can offer unique and desirable tools for constructive change. Southeast Asian leaders seem to recognize the importance of efficient government and economic institutions that can more effectively produce and distribute consumer goods to growing internal markets, while assuring increased political stability. In all the societies of Southeast Asia these tools are more significant than ideology. The best source for guidance and help in forging these tools is still the United States. ■

¹¹ With respect to Thailand and her goals of normalizing relations with Indochina, while at the same time retaining "close and friendly" relations with the United States, note Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, *Press Release*, numbers 5 (policy statement of April 30, 1976) 1 and 2 (the latter containing the above quote).

THE PHILIPPINES

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hopes to chart a more independent course for the Philippines in the years ahead. In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Marcos has tried to achieve recognition as a fellow Asian power, a position that has not been hurt by the declaration of martial law, and here he seems to have had some

success. Yet Marcos remains trapped in a Philippine dilemma that even martial law cannot resolve. Philippine leaders are sensitive to Asian criticism that they are really not Asian in mental outlook, and they attempt to respond defensively to this criticism. Yet most of them are proud of their imported Western trappings and their consciously careless cosmopolitanism, aspects of Filipino urban life that are the major sources of doubt about their Asian character.

Investor confidence surged immediately after the imposition of martial law. In fact, in the belief that hard economic decisions could be made and enforced under martial law, the Philippine economy prospered despite the disastrous floods of 1972. Some of the successes of this period could be attributed to the boon in raw material export prices that preceded the energy shortage and the ensuing deflation of the economies of the developed countries. But some of the credit has to be given to the image of stability and fiscal rationality created by the regime. The Philippines suffered the effects of the recent worldwide recession, and 1975 closed with bulging trade deficits, mounting inflation, declining levels of nutrition, and inflated unemployment. While the final statistics for 1976 are not yet in, it is apparent that considerable improvement has taken place, but the economic situation is still far from ideal. This is particularly true in view of the country's population growth rate, which at an estimated 3 percent per year remains one of the highest in Asia.

Ferdinand Marcos has embarked on an experiment in which there is no turning back. Some of his adversaries in Manila confide in private that Marcos is either very brave or very foolish. If the former, they say, there is much in him to be admired; if the latter, he must be pitied. In either case, he is in a vulnerable and unenviable position. To survive, he must achieve the outward appearance of success. He has already ridden the back of the tiger longer than many predicted he could, but he surely must greet the arrival of each September 23 anniversary with increasing uneasiness.

With each passing year, the novelty of martial-law rule dims, the overly optimistic hopes of the democratic revolution fade, and the most basic, formidable, and apparently insoluble problems of the Philippines doggedly persist. The old society has been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of most Filipinos, but as martial law continues, Ferdinand Marcos may find it increasingly difficult to justify its further continuation without significant and long-range accomplishments to its credit. Martial law has recorded some achievements, but most of these have been modest and far from "revolutionary." How long such modest achievements will be sufficient is something the Filipino people themselves will decide. ■

VIETNAM

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and the economic situation has not been stabilized.

The process of absorbing the entire infrastructure of the United States-sponsored regime—minus those who managed to flee in the final days of the war—will require time, tolerance and thousands of case-by-case judgments. The prospects for ultimate success in healing the deep divisions of the wartime period look better if one looks at the hundreds of thousands of ordinary soldiers and civil servants who were the unwilling victims of foreign intervention and who have already received full citizenship rights (95 percent of them were said to have voted in the April, 1976, elections).²⁷ Moreover, the government went out of its way to deny the frequent rumor that families would be held responsible for crimes committed by former Saigon personnel. Thus *Saigon Giai Phong* assured its readers that once reeducation had been completed, "the family will absolutely not be called a 'soldier's family' or a 'puppet family,' in order to avoid reopening old wounds for those miserable families. . . ."²⁸

Unlike the Soviet and Chinese models of socialist transformation, the Vietnamese approach does not anticipate a violent struggle. Instead, the Lao Dong party emphasizes national unity in the achievement of socialism. Neither private capitalists, nor the petty bourgeoisie, nor any rural social class is considered the enemy of the Vietnamese revolution in its present phase. The party newspaper made the significant observation in September, 1975, that the "comprador bourgeoisie," comprising only "dishonest" businessmen, was the "sole exploiting class remaining in the South."²⁹

Those industrialists and businessmen who do not oppose the revolutionary administration and who contribute to economic development (the "national bourgeoisie") are viewed as capable of making a peaceful and voluntary transformation from private capitalists to managers of state-owned enterprises. The small

²⁷ Patrice De Beer interview with Nguyen Huu Tho, *Le Monde*, May 8, 1976.

²⁸ *Saigon Giai Phong*, August 30, 1975.

²⁹ Editorial, *Nhan Dan*, September 14, 1975.

³⁰ This was the view expressed in a major work on Vietnamese socialism by Le Duan, "Revolution Is a Task of the Masses," in *On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam*, vol. 1 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), pp. 85–101.

³¹ Claude Delachet and E. Guillon, "The New South Vietnam," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September, 1975, p. 15.

³² *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 11, 1976, p. 31.

³³ For an excellent analysis of the program of collectivization of agriculture in North Vietnam, see David W. P. Elliott, "Political Integration in North Vietnam: The Cooperativization Period," in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 165–193.

merchants who generally profited from the dependent economy generated by American military forces and aid are regarded as working people, whose transformation is not a matter of reform but of expanding production and absorbing them into productive activities.³⁰

The party recognizes that the country needs the managerial talent and capital of these businessmen during the transitional period in which the socialist sector of the economy does not have the capacity to absorb the private sector. So the government is appealing to their patriotism to get them to subordinate personal interests to those of the nation. Ultimately, their enterprises will become joint state-private enterprises, and they will continue to hold managerial positions, receiving an annual fixed "interest" which amounts to the purchase of the enterprise by the state.³¹

In the rural areas of South Vietnam, the party's policy calls for solidarity in the effort to increase production. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in the North following the war against the French, when a movement to mobilize peasants to struggle against landlords was organized in conjunction with the land redistribution campaign. The absence of class conflict today reflects the virtual disappearance of the landlord class that dominated rural society in South and Central Vietnam for so long.

There are important differences between Central and South Vietnam in this regard. In Central Vietnam, where the land reforms of the former Saigon regime never applied, there has been extensive redistribution of land since the war ended. More than 25 percent of the cultivable land in one province has been expropriated and redistributed to the landless and land-poor.³² But no political campaign accompanied the reform. In the South, the remaining redistribution of land is accomplished by persuading the more prosperous peasants to give up some of their land voluntarily.

Vietnamese Marxists view the economy of small family farms as an obstacle to achieving the country's full agricultural potential. But for several reasons, the party intends to move very cautiously on organizing agricultural collectivization in the South. The social and economic conditions that prompted the move to organize cooperatives in the North between 1958 and 1960 are not found in the South today. In the North, there was too little land per family, even after the redistribution program was completed; a survey of peasant families showed a significant proportion of them falling back into debt and mortgaging or selling their land. Party leaders feared the reconcentration of land ownership and the development of new class divisions if they did not collectivize quickly.³³ But the more fertile and less densely populated Mekong Delta region does not face the same

grim prospect—although a similar argument may also apply to the overpopulated Central Vietnamese coast.

Moreover, although the party gave strong encouragement to the organization of cooperatives in the North, one of the guiding principles of the program was that it was to be accomplished by education and propaganda, not by coercion. There is a general expectation that southern farmers, generally better off and more influenced by individualism than their northern counterparts, will be less interested in joining cooperatives.

Another factor in present agricultural policy is the lesson that has been drawn by party leadership about the experience of the cooperatives in the North. *Nhan Dan* has candidly admitted that in recent years there has been a significant decline in many cooperatives and that some have in fact ceased to be real cooperatives because of the inroads of private cultivation on collective land.³⁴ The Central Committee agreed on a resolution in late 1975 that concludes that the reason for this poor performance is that "the North carried out socialist transformation before building the material and technical bases of socialism, although these two tasks must be coordinated."³⁵ In effect, the effort to collectivize agriculture was premature, because it was carried out before the country had mechanization, fertilizer, new seed varieties, and other scientific and technical advances to insure an increase in productivity.

The lesson for cadres in the South, as emphasized by a Political Bureau member, is that they should not "mechanically repeat" the steps taken in the North, but should form a cooperative only when water conservancy projects, mechanization and the other "material and technical bases" for socialism are available.³⁶ In the meantime, cadres are urged to persuade farmers to form "labor exchange teams" (*to doi cong*), groups of 20 to 30 families, in which each family is paid according to an agreed formula for human labor or for the use of a buffalo, while retaining ownership of its land and other capital.³⁷ These teams, which are to be formed only by volunteers, are supposed to show the advantages of teamwork over individual efforts, thus making the acceptance of cooperatives more likely later.

³⁴ *Nhan Dan*, February 27, 1974.

³⁵ Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Determine a Correct Concept, Increase the Capability and Quality of Cadres and Party Members," *Hoc Tap*, September, 1976.

³⁶ *Ibid.* The same point was made earlier in Ho Liem, "South Vietnam in the New Stage of the Revolution," *Hoc Tap*, December, 1975.

³⁷ Ho Liem, "South Vietnam in the New Stage of the Revolution," *Hoc Tap*, December, 1975.

³⁸ Che Viet Tan, "Developing the Combined Strength of the Unified Economy," *Hoc Tap*, December, 1975.

³⁹ Nguyen Duy Trinh, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Hanoi Radio, February 2, 1976.

Vietnamese leaders long ago rejected the notion that Vietnam should be relegated to the "rural area" of the world economy and have always put top priority in their long-range development plans on the construction of heavy industry. After 30 years of conflict and war, they feel that Vietnam must make up for lost time in her development effort. The party's Central Committee adopted a resolution at its 24th Plenum late in 1975 to "endeavor to virtually complete the construction of the material and technical bases of socialism in our country in the space of 15 to 20 years."³⁸

Although the Soviet Union has provided about \$1 billion in aid for the 1976–1980 period, it will only cover the country's most basic and immediate economic needs and rebuild part of its economic infrastructure. Moreover, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh has indicated that this will be the last major grant aid from socialist countries, although there will probably be more loans.³⁹ Vietnam also hopes to coax loans out of the World Bank, which it joined in September, 1976, and to obtain technology and raw materials through foreign investments.

But these resources are not expected to furnish more than a fraction of the capital required, and the Vietnamese are prepared to rely on their own efforts. In January, 1975, Central Committee spokesman Hoang Tung said in an interview with this writer that the government would try to assure each family a standard of living which would be "sufficient" and would then ask them to accept it for 10 to 20 years in order to accumulate the capital necessary to finance the building of a modern industrial economy. Since the end of the war, there has apparently been an important revision in the party's policy, which emphasizes the importance of material incentives to the success of socialist accumulation. Le Duan, first secretary of the party, in informal speeches to people in one North Vietnamese province last Tet, promised that consumer goods now considered luxuries would be available to all within the next decade if they worked hard enough. In one talk, he declared, "In about ten years our society will see to it that each home has beautiful things to display on the lunar new years and will take care of everything human life may need." In another, he said, the Vietnamese people had to "struggle" to insure that in five to ten years, "every home has a radio set, a refrigerator and a television set."⁴⁰

To accomplish this will require not only sacrifice but a substantial reorganization of the society in order to increase food production while at the same time stepping up exports, which Vietnam must have to import industrial machinery. Reunified Vietnam has a population of nearly 50 million, with a labor force of 21 million. The population is very poorly distributed geographically as well as in terms of economic

function. The Red River Delta in the North and the Central Vietnamese coastal plain have population densities that strain their agricultural resources to the limits, while mountainous and hilly areas in all three regions are underpopulated. Economic specialists are already drawing up plans to move several million people from high-density regions to areas where they can clear land for agriculture, exploit the country's abundant forest resources, and grow other export crops.⁴¹

The "new economic zones" now being formed are only the beginning of a vast redistribution of Vietnam's population. This internal migration rather than the restructuring of the ownership of capital, may be the main drama in Vietnamese society over the next few years. ■

⁴¹ Che Viet Tan, *op. cit.*

CAMBODIA

(Continued from page 217)

army. At least one prominent anti-revolutionary resistance leader, Prince Chantarangsey, was reported killed.²⁸

In the course of the month, there were reports of Khmer "hot pursuit" over the border as well as the deaths of Thai policemen who stepped on mines laid near the frontier. Bangkok's unusually calm attitude demonstrates that the mutual nonaggression agreement signed by the two states in November, 1975, was more than a diplomatic formality. The Thai government also shipped large quantities of salt to Cambodia at this time and has regularly transported Chinese aid to the border. The alliance survived an icy test when Radio Phnom Penh rebroadcast, without comment, a Vietnamese declaration accusing Thailand of complicity in the Siem Reap bombings.

Khmer-Thai relations progressed in June, 1976, when a joint border commission was established, and further commercial agreements were made. Phnom Penh agreed to consider releasing detained Thai fisherman and to consider allowing the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to open an office in Phnom Penh for the repatriation of Khmer nationals exiled in Thailand.²⁹ These terms set the pattern for Thailand's normalization of relations with Laos and Vietnam in August, 1976. In total, the rapidly expanding web of multilateral regional relations marks

²⁸ *The New York Times*, January 21, 24, and 27, 1976; *Le Monde*, January 31, 1976; March 19, 1976; May 9-10, 1976.

²⁹ *Le Monde*, June 20-21, 1976.

³⁰ *Le Monde*, June 2, 1976; June 4, 1976; June 6-7, 1976.

³¹ *Le Monde*, July 31, 1976; September 4, 1976. The French embassy affair resulting in the evacuation of foreign residents of Cambodia after the war is discussed in *Current History*, December, 1975, pp. 221-22.

a definitive end to United States imperial mediation of the area's conflicts and holds open the possibility that problems that arise between Southeast Asian neighbors can be handled in peaceful, diplomatic ways.

Beyond the Southeast Asian region, Democratic Kampuchea has strengthened her position as a non-aligned state by normalizing relations with many non-Communist states and by refusing to follow China's lead in extending diplomatic recognition to Chile's military regime.³⁰ In contrast to the progress of diplomacy in most of the West, Cambodia's relations with France deteriorated in 1976. While continuing to excuse herself for diplomatic affronts committed during the Phnom Penh embassy affair of 1975, France forcibly closed the Mission of Democratic Kampuchea in Paris at the end of July, 1976, accusing the Cambodians of ignoring requests to resume normal diplomatic relations. Khmer suspicions that France's conception of "normal" relations involve the resumption of neo-colonial patterns of the past are reinforced with each official French statement criticizing Phnom Penh's policies.³¹

The United States maintains a similarly inflexible attitude toward Cambodia, though public expression of its policy was avoided during an election year. The cost of inflexibility is isolation, however; many French and American allies, including the United Kingdom, established relations with Phnom Penh during 1976. Others recognizing Cambodia include the Philippines, Singapore, Peru, Mexico and Greece. The Khmer revolutionaries have actively contributed to the post-war regional integration of Southeast Asia while consolidating Cambodia's position as a nonaligned state. Despite these signs of the growing acceptance of Cambodia's revolution, Phnom Penh has not yet relaxed its guard against hostile foreign powers who might still attempt to disrupt the people's state. ■

LAOS

(Continued from page 221)

French colonialists and Japanese and West German "monopoly capitalists" are trying to make Laos dependent on them through economic and cultural measures.

In their foreign policy perspective, the Pathet Lao leaders see the Indochinese Communist victories as "upsetting the global strategy of the United States imperialists" and marking the collapse of neocolonialism. The victories create a new opportunity for revolution in Southeast Asia and provide a lesson to countries that are engaged in the national liberation struggle. The party acknowledges a debt for its victory to the solidarity of the three Indochinese peoples—particularly to the assistance of the Vietnamese—and the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of

China and other socialist countries of the third world.

In projecting future foreign relations, Pathet Lao leaders give first place to their relationship with the Vietnamese. They carefully skirt the Sino-Soviet dispute by acknowledging their respect and friendship for both allies. They assert that diplomatic relations with the United States should be maintained and that the United States must be pressed for funds to "heal the wounds of war." The disagreements that France, Japan and West Germany have with the United States should be used to advantage and French, Japanese and West German scientific and technical knowledge should be tapped, although Laotians must guard against the desire of foreigners to intervene in Lao internal affairs. Vigilance must be maintained against Thai reactionaries, but the neutralist and independent politicians in Thailand who seek normal relations with Laos should be encouraged.

Thus, the new Communist leaders of Laos, having effected a remarkably bloodless seizure of power, are undertaking an even more formidable challenge in attempting to move their country to prosperity in a socialist and independent mold. Their acknowledged dependence upon Vietnamese mentors during the formation of their movement, and their less publicized reliance on North Vietnamese advisers and troops during the years of civil war raise questions about their ability to establish an independent Laos in the shadow of unified Vietnam. Their country's lack of developed economic resources, the low level of education, and the flight of thousands of Laotians with technical and commercial training raise questions about their capacity to make Laos a self-reliant, prosperous state. The sporadic operation of resistance elements maintaining the flag of counterrevolution and the enormous time devoted to reeducation within the government further delay the forward movement of a traditionally languid people.

Yet the final stage of the "national democratic revolution" revealed a party tempered by two decades of hardship, which was capable of positioning itself and preparing popular consciousness in order to "seize the opportunity" when it presented itself. The Pathet Lao's relentless, disciplined pursuit of political power, even though it was abetted by the adversaries' mistakes, suggests a party that is organizationally firm and effectively inspired by doctrine. Whether that doctrine and organization are applicable to the economic and political development of Laos—the next stage of the revolution—remains the next great challenge. ■

Erratum: We regret an error on page 179 of our April, 1976, issue. The publisher of the book, *Interest and Ideology*, is W. H. Freeman and Company (San Francisco, 1975).

THAILAND

(Continued from page 223)

Seni publicly declared that the Communist insurgent threat to Thailand is the "worst ever."¹⁸

The insurgency in the northeastern provinces has become much more ominous and threatening since the fall of Indochina to Communist control.¹⁹ The greatly increased access to this impoverished region, especially from the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, has expanded the infiltration of Communist weapons and trained cadre. External interference is exacerbating to some degree the serious economic and social conditions in these strategic provinces. The economy in the northeast is still in a depressed stage, and in spite of much foreign aid and sizable development projects sponsored by the central government, the standard of living is still considerably below the Thai average. While the government has sought to increase the assimilation of the northeastern people into the mainstream of Thai society through new educational and welfare programs, the 13 million people of these impoverished provinces still have a strong regional identity and a feeling of being neglected by the Bangkok authorities.

These and other grievances in the northeast are being exploited by Communist agents trained in Laos and Vietnam. A military document recently stolen from Vietnamese sources revealed that for the first time Hanoi has developed a specific insurgent strategy, which entails the formation of a "liberated" area 50 to 100 kilometers wide along the Thai side of the Mekong River in the general vicinity of Vientiane.²⁰ The Communist leaders in Hanoi regard this territory as an area that can become a "protectorate" of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

THE ECONOMY

The Thai economy is still trying to stage a comeback from the serious reversals of the early 1970's, when, after almost two decades of impressive economic growth, the economy received significant setbacks because of external factors beyond Thailand's control. Since 1972, Thailand has faced increased foreign competition in agricultural commodities, reduced international prices for agricultural exports, greatly increased prices for petroleum products, higher costs for manufactured imports, a reduction in foreign investment, and the termination of United States military aid and air bases. Economic recession

¹⁸ *Bangkok World*, June 24, 1976.

¹⁹ For an analysis of recent developments in the northeastern insurgency see Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm," *Asian Survey* (August, 1975), pp. 684-92.

²⁰ *Bangkok Post*, March 30, 1974.

has also been caused by important internal factors, including an increasing number of labor strikes, the decline of domestic investment, increasing political instability, and growing unemployment.

During 1976, the economy gave several signs of improvement. The volume and prices of agricultural exports increased significantly and provided the country with more income.²¹ Domestic industrial production expanded slightly, reducing some segments of unemployment. Tourism, which has become a major source of hard-currency income, increased by 17 percent over 1975, to an annual figure of 4,538 million baht (\$227 million). The discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Siam is expected to reduce Thailand's dependence on foreign sources of fuel within four years.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT

One of Thailand's most difficult tasks is the promotion of private foreign investment. This problem is also closely linked to the need to expand domestic private investment. It involves an intangible element of trust and confidence in the future of Thailand and in the development of Thailand's impressive human and natural resources. Foreign and domestic investment declined after the overthrow of the Thamom military regime in October, 1973, and after the Communist victories in Indochina in April, 1975. The Thai government has sought to reverse this trend. Ob Vasuratha, president of the Board of Trade, urged the Seni Cabinet to improve industrial zones in and around Bangkok and to provide potential investors with better facilities and services.²² He noted that in 1975 there were 82 new investors in Thailand, with a total capital of 9,220 million baht; in the first six months of 1976, there were only 32 investors in the kingdom, with a total capital of 1,020 million baht.

The budget for 1977 was approved on August 6 by 250 to 54 votes in the lower house. The major items in the new budget are as follows:

Education	14,731,000,000	baht
Economic Development	14,426,700,000	"
Defense	13,094,000,000	"
Public Utilities	4,726,000,000	"
Internal Security	3,958,000,000	"
Public Health	3,286,500,000	"
Debt Service	6,417,000,000	"
General Administration	3,913,000,000	"
Other Public Expenses	4,237,000,000	"

This budget involves a sizable deficit because it is based on an income of 54,000 million baht. Seni Pramoj explained that the deficit would be handled by internal borrowing. He also expressed the hope

²¹ "News From Home," May 1-25, 1976, *op. cit.*

²² "News From Home," August 16-31, 1976, *op. cit.*

that augmented income from agricultural exports would help reduce the budget deficit.

In summary, Thailand faces one of the most serious security problems in her entire history. The government is trying to preserve its national independence and territorial integrity by pursuing a foreign policy involving less dependence on a single major power like the United States and an increasing diversification of diplomatic relationships. Thailand is also trying to reverse a five-year economic downturn and restore her former impressive record of economic development. Some of these goals seemed to elude the democratically elected governments. Perhaps economic and security conditions will improve under the new military regime. The growing desire of an increasing number of Thai people for more individual freedom, however, will continue to present a problem. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 222)

MISCELLANY

THE MAKING OF A MISSILE CRISIS: OCTOBER 1962. BY HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 302 pages, appendix and index, \$14.95.)

This reconstruction of the origins of the Cuban missile crisis provides valuable insights into the dynamics of superpower interaction. Dinerstein examines the United States intervention against a Communist regime in Guatemala in 1954 and notes that, though a tactical success, it was a strategic failure because it alienated the non-Communist left in Latin America from the United States. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's radicalism, coupled with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's perception of strategic inferiority, prompted the Havana-Moscow entente.

The events leading up to the October, 1962, crisis and the subsequent behavior of the key actors are developed with sophistication and clarity.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

MANAGING INTERSTATE CONFLICT, 1945-1974: DATA WITH SYNOPSSES. BY LYLE BUTTERWORTH AND MARGARET E. SCRANTON. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Publications Section, 1976. 535 pages and index, \$16.95, cloth, \$6.95 paper.)

This is a useful study that lists and describes in bare outline almost all the interstate wars and disagreements that took place in the world from 1945 through 1974.

O.E.S.

(Continued on page 237)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of October, 1976, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

African Crisis

Oct. 1—In an attempt to establish a united black front for the conference on Rhodesia, 2 rival leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo, meet in Botswana.

Oct. 8—British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland announces that a conference on Rhodesia will be held in Geneva, beginning October 25. Britain's representative at the U.N., Ivor Richard, will chair the conference.

Oct. 9—in a joint news conference in Dar Es Salaam, Joshua Nkomo of the African National Council (ANC) and Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) say they will send a joint delegation to the Geneva talks on Rhodesia. They request that the conference be delayed 2 weeks and that it deal with the "total and immediate" transfer of power to a black government in Rhodesia.

Oct. 12—The British government asks black nationalist leaders Mugabe, Nkomo and Muzorewa to attend the conference. Crosland also asks Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to attend the Geneva Conference.

Oct. 16—at the request of black nationalist leaders, British Foreign Secretary Crosland postpones the formal opening of the Geneva talks from October 25 to October 28.

Oct. 18—at the urging of the Presidents of black African nations, the British Foreign Office invites a fourth black nationalist leader, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, to attend the conference in Geneva.

Oct. 28—the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia opens for a 20-minute session; Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and the leaders of 4 Rhodesian black nationalist groups are taking part.

Oct. 29—in their opening statement on the 2d day of the Geneva Conference, the 4 black African nationalist leaders condemn Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's government and insist that Britain and not the "illegal" government of Ian Smith must grant the "right of self-determination" to the blacks; they maintain that Britain must transfer power to the black majority.

Oct. 30—U.S. Under Secretary of State William E. Schaufele, Jr., arrives in Geneva to assist in behind-the-scene negotiations; the conference itself is temporarily adjourned.

Andean Pact

Oct. 31—in Lima, Peru, delegates from the 6 Andean Pact nations fail to persuade Chile to remain in the association. Because of a dispute on economic policy, Chilean representative Adelio Pipino says that Chile will withdraw from the economic market immediately.

Arab League

(See *Middle East*)

Middle East

Oct. 1—Syrian and Lebanese Christian forces continue their assault on Palestinian guerrillas in the mountain

area northeast of Beirut, Lebanon. The Palestinians refused to enter into cease-fire negotiations with the Syrians.

In Damascus, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad rejects a Soviet request to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Oct. 3—Saudi Arabia announces plans to withdraw the troops that are stationed on the Golan Heights in Syria. The Saudi troops have been in Syria since the October, 1973, Middle East war.

Oct. 9—in Chtaura in the Syrian-occupied sector of Lebanon, talks among Lebanese, Syrian and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders resume.

Oct. 11—Arab League mediator Hassan Sabry al-Kholy announces that the Syrian, Lebanese, and PLO officials meeting in Chtaura have reached a tentative agreement on a cease-fire and on a political settlement.

Oct. 12—in an attempt to cut off the supply line from the southern Lebanese city of Saida, Syrian tanks and infantry begin an offensive against the Palestinians.

Oct. 13—Syrian troops attack Palestinian guerrillas east of Beirut. The attack forces the cancellation of cease-fire talks in Chtaura.

Oct. 14—in intensive fighting on the outskirts of Beirut, Syrian forces seal off the Muslim sector of Beirut from the rest of Lebanon.

Oct. 16—in response to a Saudi request for a cease-fire (the first time Saudi Arabia has intervened in the crisis), Palestinian and Syrian troops stop fighting.

Oct. 17—in Riyadh, a 2-day summit meeting begins; Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, PLO leader Yasir Arafat, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Saudi Arabian King Khalid and Kuwaiti Sheik Sabah al-Salam al-Sabah attend.

Oct. 18—the 6 Arab leaders meeting in Riyadh sign an agreement calling for a cease-fire on October 21 and the creation of a 30,000-man Arab peace-keeping force to supervise the withdrawal of all troops to positions held before the civil war began in April, 1975. The Arab force is to be headed by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis. Under the plan, Palestinian guerrillas will be restricted to refugee camps and to the Arkub section in southeast Lebanon.

Oct. 20—in Damascus, PLO leader Yasir Arafat meets with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Oct. 21—the 1st formal cease-fire in Lebanon in 7 months goes into effect at 6 A.M. A radio report indicates that the cease-fire is about 60 percent effective.

Oct. 22—Cease-fire violations continue along the Israeli-Lebanese border; Lebanese right-wing Christian forces using Israeli-supplied weapons and Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim forces are still in conflict.

Oct. 25—in Cairo, representatives of the 21 members of the Arab League meet to discuss the settlement 6 Arab nations reached in Riyadh. 19 of the 21 members vote to approve the settlement. Iraq and Libya vote against the resolution that creates a 30,000-man Arab peace-keeping force for Lebanon.

Oct. 26—the two-day Arab League conference ends. The exact make-up of the peace-keeping force is not disclosed.

United Nations

- Oct. 12—Secretary General Kurt Waldheim announces that he is willing to serve a 2d 5-year term as Secretary General of the United Nations.
- Oct. 13—The U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs issues a report on the "Future of the World Economy," which says that the major limits to sustained economic growth are political, institutional and social rather than physical, and that the gap between rich and poor nations can be narrowed by the year 2000.
- Oct. 18—President Luis Echeverría of Mexico makes known his availability to oppose Kurt Waldheim for a 5-year term as Secretary General of the United Nations.
- Oct. 19—The United States, France and Britain veto a Security Council resolution that would have imposed an embargo on arms shipments to South Africa.
- Oct. 22—The Security Council approves a 1-year extension of the U.N. peace-keeping force in the Sinai peninsula.
- Oct. 26—The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) begins a 5-week general conference in Nairobi, Kenya.

In a resolution approved 134 to 0 (with the U.S. abstaining), the General Assembly calls on member governments to prohibit all "contacts" with the new South African state of Transkei; the resolution is intended to show disapproval of South Africa's apartheid policies and of the establishment of this first "independent" South African homeland for blacks.

Warsaw Pact

- Oct. 12—The Soviet press agency Tass reports that the Warsaw Pact countries have named Soviet Colonel General Anatoly Gribkov as chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact.

ANGOLA

- Oct. 8—in Moscow, President Agostinho Neto and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign a 20-year friendship pact.

CAMBODIA

- Oct. 21—A report in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* says that the government has ended the large-scale executions of soldiers and civilians.

CANADA

- Oct. 13—Defense Minister James A. Richardson resigns from the Cabinet because he disagrees with the government's proposal that the French language be made an official language, along with English.
- Oct. 14—Members of the Canadian Labor Congress stay away from their jobs to protest the government's wage and price control policies.
- Oct. 19—in 2 by-elections, the ruling Liberal party is defeated by the Progressive Conservatives.
- Oct. 25—Indians of the Northwest Territories file a formal request with Minister for Indian and Northern Affairs Warren Allmand; they demand ownership rights and separate political jurisdiction for 450,000 square miles of federally administered territory.

CHILE

(See also *Intl. Andean Pact*)

- Oct. 14—A U.N. report accuses the Chilean military government of systematically extending its practices of torture, arbitrary arrests and deportation.
- Oct. 20—The Chilean embassy in Washington, D.C., of-

ficially asks the U.S. government to end all U.S. economic assistance programs in Chile.

CHINA

- Oct. 5—in the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua delivers the first foreign policy address since Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death in September.
- Oct. 9—Wall posters in Peking say that Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng has been chosen as Chinese Communist party Chairman, succeeding Mao Tse-tung. There is no official confirmation.
- Oct. 12—an official spokesman says that Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng has been named Chairman of the Chinese Communist party and chairman of the Military Commission. He will also continue as Prime Minister.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that 4 prominent leftist members of the Politburo have been arrested; they include Chiang Ching, Chairman Mao's widow, and Chang Chun-chiao, senior Deputy Prime Minister.

- Oct. 15—in Shanghai, wall posters name the 4 prominent leftists accused of plotting against the party and of plotting to assassinate Hua Kuo-feng.
- Oct. 16—in Shanghai, large crowds demonstrate against Chiang Ching.

There are reports in Peking that more leftists have been removed from their posts and arrested.

- Oct. 23—for the 3d successive day, demonstrators parade in Shanghai, Peking, Canton and Tientsin against the four arrested leftist leaders. Peking television broadcasts the demonstrations around the world by satellite.
- Oct. 24—in Tien An Men square, Hua Kuo-feng is acclaimed by 1 million people as Chairman of China's Communist party.
- Oct. 25—an editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, the Communist party newspaper, states that the new government will carry out the economic development program of the late Prime Minister Chou En-lai.
- Oct. 26—a Hong Kong newspaper reports that Mao Tse-tung's widow, Chiang Ching, removed Communist party documents and altered them before returning them to the files shortly after Mao's death. Chiang Ching's action prompted Hua Kuo-feng to order the arrest of Ching and her colleagues.
- Oct. 27—Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang is reported to have said that the 5th 5-year plan, originally scheduled for January, 1976, is scheduled to begin in early 1977.

CUBA

- Oct. 6—a Cuban passenger jet carrying 73 people crashes in the Caribbean Sea near Barbados. A bomb reportedly exploded on board before the plane plummetted.
- Oct. 7—in Trinidad, 2 Cuban exiles are arrested on charges of planting a bomb on the Cuban jetliner that crashed yesterday.
- Oct. 15—Prime Minister Fidel Castro accuses the U.S. of involvement in the sabotage of the Cuban plane that crashed last week. He says that he will end the 1973 anti-hijacking agreement he made with the U.S. government.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger denies that the U.S. was involved in any way with the jetliner crash.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl. Middle East*)

- Oct. 1—in an unscheduled visit to Paris, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy meets with French President Valéry Giscard

d'Estaing and French Prime Minister Raymond Barre. They reportedly discuss the situation in Lebanon.

Oct. 16—President Anwar Sadat is sworn in as President for a 2d 6-year term.

Oct. 28—Egyptians vote for 1,660 candidates seeking the 347 seats in the national parliament, the People's Assembly; this is the first relatively free balloting in Egypt since the 1950's.

Oct. 31—In the parliamentary elections, the centrist political bloc led by Prime Minister MAMDough Soleem wins 90 of the 112 seats up for election. Run-off elections for the remaining seats will be held in November. This is the first election since 1952 in which voters have been given a choice of candidates.

EL SALVADOR

Oct. 9—In New York City, Colonel Manuel Alfonso Rodriguez, formerly the 3d highest ranking official in the government, is convicted of conspiring to sell 10,000 submachine guns illegally in the U.S.

FRANCE

(See also *Egypt*)

Oct. 7—Nearly 6 million workers stage a 24-hour strike to protest the government's austerity measures.

In Teheran, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announces an \$8-billion agreement according to which France will construct 2 nuclear power plants in Iran.

Oct. 11—The High Council for Foreign Nuclear Policy agrees to cooperate with other nations toward limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 3—Parliamentary elections are held.

Election returns give Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's coalition government of the Social Democratic party and the Free Democratic party an 8-seat parliamentary majority over the Christian Democratic party of Helmut Kohl.

Oct. 17—The government revalues the mark by an average of 3 percent against the six other West European currencies.

INDIA

Oct. 15—The government announces plans to nationalize the India-based operations of the Caltex Petroleum Corporation. The corporation will receive \$24 million in compensation.

Oct. 17—Jayaprakash Narayan, a political opponent of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's, leads a newly formed civil rights organization, the People's Union for Civil Liberties.

Oct. 30—The government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announces that elections for Parliament are being postponed until early 1978.

IRAN

(See *France*)

IRELAND

Oct. 15—The Supreme Court rules that the emergency powers bill is not "repugnant" to the constitution and that the state of emergency is constitutional.

Oct. 18—Defense Minister Patrick Donegan calls President Gearbhail O Dalaigh a "thundering disgrace" for referring the government's emergency powers bill to the Court.

Oct. 21—In Parliament, a motion calling for Defense Minister Donegan's dismissal is rejected, 63 to 58.

Oct. 22—President O Dalaigh resigns.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Oct. 4—In the Israeli-occupied area of the West Bank, 7 Arab youths are shot and wounded by an Israeli civilian. The incident occurs after fighting yesterday between Muslims and Jews in Hebron. Each group has accused the other of vandalizing a shrine.

Oct. 18—Asher Yadlin, governor-designate of the Bank of Israel, is arrested on suspicion of bribery and fraud. He is a leading member of the Labor party.

Oct. 22—74 Arab youths are arrested in the West Bank area on charges of desecrating Jewish religious artifacts during the violence of October 3.

Oct. 24—The Cabinet appoints Arnon Gafny director general of the Bank of Israel and withdraws the nomination of Asher Yadlin, who was arrested October 18.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *U.S., Political Scandal*)

LEBANON

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

MEXICO

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 27—The government refloats the peso and allows it to drop by 24.9 percent to a record low of 26.50 pesos to the U.S. dollar.

MOZAMBIQUE

(See *Rhodesia*)

NAMIBIA

Oct. 22—In Windhoek, delegates to a multiracial constitutional committee agree to a proposal to create an interim government. A plenary session of the constitutional conference must approve the plan.

NIGERIA

Oct. 7—The military government releases a draft of a democratic constitution; a constituent assembly will be held in 1977 to accept or reject it.

PHILIPPINES

Oct. 16—A national referendum is held on the continuation of martial law. Voting is mandatory.

Oct. 27—The commission on elections announces overwhelming popular approval of the continuation of martial law and the 9 constitutional amendments proposed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

PORTUGAL

Oct. 1—in an attempt to decrease the Communist party influence in labor unions, the government rescinds rulings that established a single national trade union.

Oct. 23—Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is arrested and ordered to serve 20 years in prison for speaking at a leftist political meeting.

RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, African Crisis*)

Oct. 3—Black nationalist leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa ends 14 months of self-imposed exile.

Oct. 7—Black nationalists guerrillas blow up a railroad bridge while an ore train is crossing the Matetsi River. The nationalists are believed to be supported and encouraged by the Marxist government in Mozambique.

Oct. 30—In an attack by black nationalists near Victoria Falls, 1 white is killed and several are wounded.

In a "hot pursuit" operation, Rhodesian troops cross the Mozambique border; 14 blacks and 4 whites are killed.

Oct. 31—A Rhodesian army report notes a Mozambique troop build-up 400 yards from the border near Umtali.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Namibia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 8—In the 1st meeting between Prime Minister John Vorster and 7 black homeland leaders since the black rioting broke out nearly 4 months ago, Vorster rejects the blacks' demands that political prisoners be released and that a multiracial conference be held to discuss the race problem.

Oct. 19—The Transkei National Independence party selects Chief Botha Sigcau to be President of the Transkei African homeland when it becomes independent October 26.

Oct. 24—For the 3d time in a week, fighting breaks out in Soweto between police and attenders at a funeral for one of the black rioters. 6 people are reported killed.

Transkei

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 26—In a ceremony in Umtata, South African President Nicholaas Diederichs grants the Transkei "independence." Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima becomes the Prime Minister and Chief Botha Sigcau becomes the President of the republic. Formerly, Transkei was a black "homeland" inside South Africa.

The U.S. government says it will not recognize the nation because of South Africa's policies of apartheid and black "homelands."

SPAIN

Oct. 2—Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez orders 2 conservative generals, Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago y Diaz Mendivil and Lieutenant General Carlos Iniesta Cano, on reserve. Both generals have publicly criticized Suarez for replacing Diaz Mendivil, Deputy Prime Minister, with Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, a liberal general.

Oct. 4—in San Sebastian, Juan Maria de Araluce y Villar, a member of the Council of the Realm, and 3 of his bodyguards are killed. Members of the Basque separatist movement claim responsibility for the killing.

SWEDEN

Oct. 7—Thorbjorn Falldin is officially elected Prime Minister by the Center party.

Oct. 8—Prime Minister Falldin addresses Parliament. He names a 20-member Cabinet that includes 5 women.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

THAILAND

Oct. 6—Right-wing, anti-Communist military leaders take control of the government. Defense Minister Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu abolishes the 1974 constitution and declares himself head of the Administrative Reform Committee, which will rule the country.

The take-over follows bloody battles between police and university students in which 30 people were reported killed and 1,700 students were arrested. The universities are closed.

Oct. 8—Sa-ngad Chaloryu, leader of the new military government, announces King Phumiphol Aduldet's appointment of Supreme Court Justice Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister.

Oct. 11—The military government orders purges of civilian ministries and of the military.

Admiral Chaloryu forms a 13-member commission to draft a new constitution.

Oct. 13—Prime Minister-designate Thanin Kraivichien says that elections will not be held for at least 4 years.

Oct. 16—Under a new order permitting the detention of suspected Communists for up to 30 days, leftist intellectuals are taken into custody.

Oct. 20—The government discloses that nearly 4,000 people have been arrested since the October 4 coup; approximately two-thirds are still in custody.

Oct. 22—King Phumiphol Aduldet swears in a 17-member government. Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu becomes Defense Minister and General Boonchai Bamroongphong, former army commander in chief, becomes a Deputy Prime Minister.

Oct. 24—Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anand Panyarachun is ousted from his position in the foreign ministry and suspended from the civil service.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Military*)

Oct. 14—A manned Soyuz spacecraft is launched; it is to hook up with an orbiting space station.

Oct. 16—The Soyuz mission is aborted because of mechanical failures. The spacecraft unintentionally splashes down in a lake in Soviet Kazakhstan.

Oct. 25—in Moscow, after a 5-day sit-in in a reception room of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 30 Jewish protesters are arrested. They are demanding permission to leave the country.

Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev forecasts a bumper grain harvest; he predicts a harvest of almost 222.5 million tons, the 1973 record.

Oct. 27—Economic planning chief Nikolai K. Baibakov announces production goals for 1977; he says that if the 1976-1980 plan is successful, the Soviets may exceed the 1975 U.S. industrial and agricultural output by 1980.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, African Crisis*)

Oct. 7—The government increases the minimum lending rate from 13 percent to 15 percent and increases the amount banks must leave on deposit in the Bank of England.

Oct. 11—in Parliament, an emergency debate on the economy is held in the House of Commons.

Oct. 14—the government announces a \$600-million increase in the balance of payments deficit for the month of September.

Oct. 27—the pound drops to \$1.5720.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Oct. 1—Government sources report that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has uncovered no evidence that would support criminal charges of 1972 campaign financing irregularities against President Gerald Ford.

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen reports that President Ford gave Earl Butz, Agriculture Secretary, a "severe reprimand" for offensive racial remarks made in public.

Oct. 4—Agriculture Secretary Butz resigns with an apology for "gross indiscretion" in making a racial slur; President Ford accepts his resignation.

Oct. 5—The Federal Election Commission reports that it will enforce its regulations in the current presidential and congressional campaigns although its rules did not achieve the status of law in the 94th session of Congress; only 29 of the 30 legislative days necessary to establish the regulations as law elapsed before Congress adjourned.

In a study made public today, the General Accounting Office concludes that President Ford did not exhaust diplomatic channels before resorting to force in the *Mayagüez* incident of May 12, 1975, when U.S. forces attacked Cambodia to free a U.S. merchant ship, the *Mayagüez*, and her crew.

Oct. 9—President Ford signs a proclamation restricting the amount of foreign beef that can be imported into the U.S. this year.

Oct. 12—The nationwide swine flu vaccination program is halted temporarily when 3 elderly persons die in Pittsburgh shortly after receiving shots.

Oct. 13—The Federal Center for Disease Control in Atlanta reports that 14 persons in 9 states died within 48 hours of receiving vaccinations against swine flu; the center says, however, that there is no evidence that any of the deaths were caused by the vaccine.

Acting Secretary of Agriculture John Knebel announces a presidential decision to increase price support loans on wheat by 50 percent and on corn by 20 percent.

Oct. 15—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District reverses a lower court ruling in Brooklyn that blocked the sale of offshore oil leases off the east coast; the sale of the leases proceeded on August 17 under a temporary stay of the injunction blocking the sale.

The Food and Drug Administration proposes the phase-out of all nonessential use of fluorocarbons as propellants in spray cans; no timetable for the initiation of the proposals is suggested.

Oct. 20—The Federal Power Commission, admitting errors in a July 1 increase in rates charged for newly discovered natural gas and for most existing gas, reduces the increase in rates by 25 percent.

Oct. 22—in a policy statement, President Ford says that 1,550 jet airplanes that do not meet current noise standards must be modified to meet the standards; otherwise they must be replaced in an 8-year program to start January 1.

Oct. 28—The Federal Center for Disease Control in Atlanta reports that 5 million Americans have received swine flu immunization; about 40 deaths, mostly among the elderly, have been reported.

Civil Rights

Oct. 3—A suit filed in U.S. district court in Grand Rapids, Michigan, claims that the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs may not limit the term "Indian" to a member of one of the federally recognized tribes.

Oct. 20—A spokesman for the President's Office of Management and Budget says that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare will proceed with a census of the 16,000 public schools of the U.S. to determine their composition by race, sex and other characteristics. The census, which has been conducted almost every year for 10 years, was not taken in 1975.

Oct. 25—Racial violence erupts again at Boston's Charlestown and South Boston high schools; police report 22 arrests.

Economy

Oct. 7—The Labor Department reports a rise of 0.9 percent in the wholesale price index for September.

Oct. 8—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate fell from 7.9 percent to 7.8 percent last month.

Oct. 10—The Commerce Department reports that retail sales rose only 0.1 percent in September.

Oct. 19—The Commerce Department reports that in September housing starts totaled 1.81 million, the highest level since February, 1974, up 17.6 percent from August.

The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product growth rate slowed to 4 percent in the 3d quarter of 1976.

Oct. 21—The Labor Department reports that the consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in September.

Oct. 28—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's trade balance showed a deficit of \$778.9 million for September; the 9-month deficit is \$3.4 billion.

Oct. 29—The Commerce Department reports a decline of 0.7 percent in the index of leading economic indicators for the month of September.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Cuba; South Africa, Transkei*)

Oct. 1—President Gerald Ford and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in Washington to discuss the deadlock in the strategic arms limitation (SALT) negotiations; important differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. remain.

Oct. 4—U.S. officials say that consideration is being given to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposals to the U.N. last week; Gromyko said that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to discuss on-site inspection to insure compliance with a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests.

Oct. 6—The Federal Energy Research and Development Agency reports that radioactive fallout from a Chinese nuclear weapons test of September 26 has been detected in parts of the eastern United States. The agency declares that the detected radiation levels are well below the danger level.

Oct. 8—In response to a presidential directive, the Commerce Department rules that any U.S. company receiving a request on or after October 7 bearing on the Arab boycott of Israel must report such a request within 15 days, stating the nature of the request and the company's disposition of it.

Oct. 11—President Ford reveals that on October 9 he agreed to an Israeli request to lift the ban on the sales of sophisticated U.S. military equipment to Israel; he stepped up delivery of already promised materials.

Oct. 15—Meeting with members of the American Jewish press, President Gerald Ford states that "any settlement in the Middle East should come from direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab nations."

Oct. 18—The Commerce Department releases reports from 59 companies that were asked by Arab states to comply with the terms of a boycott against Israel; all the reports were filed with the department after October 6. The release is in line with President Gerald Ford's promise of October 6 to release names.

Oct. 20—Commerce Secretary Elliot Richardson tells a House Commerce subcommittee that during the last year he tried twice unsuccessfully to get White House authorization to make public the names of U.S. companies complying with the Arab boycott against Israel.

At a news conference in Washington, D.C., President Ford says: "I would not tolerate an Arab oil embargo but . . . because of the leadership of the Ford administration, you aren't going to have an Arab oil embargo."

A Gallup poll taken in West Europe concludes that the reservoir "of good will toward the United States in West Europe is currently at its lowest level" in the 22-year history of the polls, taken under the auspices of the United States Information Agency (USIA).

Oct. 21—The State Department discloses that the administration will not extend diplomatic recognition to the South African state of Transkei when she becomes officially "independent" of South Africa on October 26.

Oct. 28—Campaigning in Ohio, President Gerald Ford announces a new and complicated program to prevent nuclear materials used in peaceful purposes from becoming weapons of war. The 14-page proposal, released in Washington, D.C., asks all nations to exercise "maximum restraint" in the export of reprocessing equipment with military usefulness.

Acting on the advice of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, President Ford allows an affiliate of the Control Data Corporation to sell 2 Cyber 172 computers to China. If final negotiations are completed, China will receive a computer that has military usefulness and is able to make calculations on nuclear tests. This action is an exception to prevailing policy.

Oct. 29—According to close aides of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it is virtually certain that Kissinger will stay as Secretary of State for at least 2 years if President Gerald Ford wins the presidency.

According to an executive of Control Data Corporation, the company is preparing to deliver a Cyber 172 computer to the Soviet Union and is also negotiating the sale of 2 units to China.

Labor and Industry

Oct. 4—The United Automobile Workers and the Ford Motor Company agree in principle on a contract to settle the 20-day strike against the company.

Oct. 5—A U.S. district court in Richmond, Virginia, fines Allied Chemical Corporation the maximum, \$13,375,000, for polluting the James River for almost 4 years with the toxic insecticide Kepone.

Oct. 9—Amtrak charges that the Department of Transportation has delayed the start of a \$1.9-billion rehabilitation program for the railroad's northeast corridor rail lines, causing the loss of an entire construction season.

Oct. 12—The United Automobile Workers Union approves a new contract with the Ford Motor Company and ends its strike against the company.

Oct. 27—11 trustees of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' Central, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund resign; the fund has been under federal investigation.

The General Motors Corporation reports record 3d quarter profits of \$397 million.

Legislation

Oct. 1—On the day before it adjourns, the 94th Congress completes action on legislation extending unemployment compensation, with a corresponding tax increase; directing the Department of Agriculture to set guidelines for timber clear-cutting in national forests; allowing the Census Bureau to conduct the national census starting in 1985 on a 5-year basis; making the first revision in copyright law since 1909; authorizing \$3.2 billion for

the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration over the next 3 years and limiting the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to a 10-year term; and increasing the loan authority of the U.S. Railway Association by \$70 million.

Oct. 4—The House Select Committee on Assassinations names Richard Sprague as chief counsel to reexamine the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.

President Gerald Ford signs the tax-revision bill.

Oct. 5—in a 5-to-4 decision, the Senate Subcommittee on Environment and Land Resources reports that Howard Callaway, former campaign director for President Gerald Ford, used his position as secretary of the army to influence the Forest Service to permit the expansion of family-owned property used as a ski resort in Crested Butte, Colorado.

Oct. 8—President Ford signs legislation providing for a national census every 5 years starting in 1985; he also signs other minor bills.

Oct. 12—President Ford signs the Toxic Substances Act, which, among other features, curbs the marketing of new chemicals.

Oct. 13—President Ford signs a \$6.5-billion annual federal revenue sharing bill. Revenue sharing will total \$25.6 billion before the expiration of the bill on October 1, 1980.

The President also signs a \$1.5-billion bill for loans and scholarships for medical students, to encourage the supplying of doctors in areas with few doctors. He also signs a \$2.1-billion bill that ties federal support to medical schools that will supply doctors for such areas.

Oct. 20—in his 64th veto, President Ford vetoes a measure under which the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture would have surveyed the land and water resources of the country and developed plans for their use.

President Ford signs the copyright revision bill and a \$1.3-billion appropriation for Amtrak for fiscal 1977 and 1978.

President Ford signs a bill revising immigration laws.

Oct. 22—President Gerald Ford signs the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act to speed the flow of natural gas from Alaskan reserves.

Military

Oct. 6—After a careful examination of the Soviet MiG-25, which a defecting Soviet pilot flew to Japan last month, Pentagon military experts report that they have concluded that the MiG is outdated; it was apparently designed for use against the U.S. supersonic B-70 bomber, plans for which were cancelled after a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960.

Oct. 17—The Defense Department is investigating reports that in an interview on April 12 for Newsweek International, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown stated that "from a strategic point of view, Israel has to be considered a burden to the United States."

Oct. 18—General George Brown appears at a Pentagon news conference to explain his position and put his remarks in the "proper perspective." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says that neither he nor President Gerald Ford considered reprimanding or discharging General Brown.

Oct. 27—The Defense Department announces that early in 1977 the Air Force will increase its strength in the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by sending an additional 84 fighters to West Germany and Britain; new supersonic F-15's will be sent to West Germany.

Oct. 31—A Phoenix missile that fell overboard from a U.S. aircraft carrier 6 weeks ago is recovered by a U.S. Navy recovery team.

Officials in the Department of Defense say the department has decided to equip the F-16 fighter plane with a nuclear capability.

Political Scandal

Oct. 14—Special Watergate Prosecutor Charles Ruff says he has found no evidence supporting an allegation that President Ford misused maritime union political contributions nor any "reason to believe that any other violations of law had occurred."

Oct. 15—Ruff refuses to inquire into allegations that as a congressman President Ford blocked a House Banking and Currency investigation into Watergate in 1972, at the request of the White House.

Oct. 24—In Washington, D.C., informed sources report that government agencies are continuing to investigate charges that South Korean diplomats and businessmen in the U.S. have bribed officials and otherwise violated U.S. law. Influence peddling and illegal campaign contributions have been charged.

Oct. 26—A U.S. court of appeals rules 2 to 1 that White House tape recordings used as evidence in the Watergate scandal cover-up can be made public, reproduced, copied, broadcast or sold as records. Herbert Miller, former President Richard Nixon's lawyer, announces that the verdict will be appealed.

Oct. 27—Government sources report that South Korean influence on U.S. politicians may involve 90 members of Congress.

U.S. Army reports made public today indicate that collusive bidding by South Korean contractors costs U.S. military units stationed in South Korea about \$20 million annually; the reports are made public by Senator William Proxmire (D., Wisc.).

Former Senator Edward Gurney (R., Fla.) is found not guilty of lying to a 1974 grand jury about a political shakedown scheme.

Oct. 28—According to federal authorities, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State Department are investigating allegations that South Korean intelligence agents and other Koreans have been coercing and violating the civil rights of Korean-Americans and Korean aliens.

John Ehrlichman, convicted in both the "plumbers" and Watergate cases, voluntarily enters prison to start serving his sentences, although appeals in both cases are still pending.

Oct. 29—According to law enforcement officials in Los Angeles, residents of the 70,000-member Korean community in that city are systematically harassed by South Korean intelligence agents because of their criticisms of the South Korean government.

Oct. 30—According to diplomatic sources in Washington, D.C., the State Department requested the Justice Department to investigate the South Korean-American trade activities of South Korean businessman Park Tong Sun last year after Senate testimony revealed that he accepted covert political payments from the Gulf Oil Corporation.

Politics

Oct. 1—White House press secretary Ron Nessen says that President Ford will leave Washington, D.C., on October 4th for a 6-day trip to California, Oklahoma and Texas.

Democratic governors of seven northeast states meet with Democratic presidential contender Jimmy Carter, former governor of Georgia, in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss ways to improve the economy of the region.

Oct. 6—President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter take part in a 2d televised debate, this time on foreign policy, in San Francisco.

Oct. 15—Senators Walter Mondale (D., Minn.) and Robert Dole (R., Kans.) the vice presidential candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties, take part in a televised debate in Houston, Texas. This is the first debate between major party vice presidential candidates in American history.

Oct. 22—at Williamsburg, Virginia, President Ford and Jimmy Carter debate for the 3d and last time.

Oct. 30—A national poll by *The New York Times* and CBS News and other national surveys show that President Gerald Ford and former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter are so evenly matched in their campaigns for the presidency that the outcome cannot be predicted.

Oct. 31—A *New York Times* survey shows states with 222 electoral votes solidly for or probably for Carter, states with 198 electoral votes solidly for or probably for the President and states with 118 electoral votes undecided.

Supreme Court

Oct. 4—The Supreme Court opens its 1976-1977 term. With 2 justices dissenting, the Court refuses to reconsider its July 2 decision upholding the death penalty. The Court lifts the stay issued by Justice Lewis Powell that blocked implementation of the decision until the full Court ruled.

Oct. 5—The Supreme Court refuses to review a U.S. district court of appeals ruling that bans the installation of electronic banking devices in public places where branch banks are prohibited. ■

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(Continued from page 230)

THE NEW GERMANS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER. By JOHN DORNBURG. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976. 293 pages and index, \$11.95.)

Relying heavily on interviews and anecdotal material, the former bureau chief of *Newsweek* in Bonn discusses the transformation of West Germany from a defeated dictatorship to an emerging democracy. His vignettes of West German cultural, social, economic, and political life are consistently interesting.

More than half West Germany's population was born after 1945. The attitudes and aspirations of the new generation suggest, says Dornberg, that Germany is firmly on the road to cooperation with the other democracies of the West. A.Z.R. ■

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